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C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co.:
Promissory Estoppel and the Right to Trial by
Jury in California
by Gary Shapiro*

In C & KEngineeringContractorsv. Amber Steel Co.I the Califor-

nia Supreme Court held that there is no right to a jury trial in an action

based upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel, 2 even when the plain-

tiff seeks only money damages. The action came about when a subcontractor revoked a bid that had been relied upon by a general contractor.

C & K Engineering, the general contractor, solicited bids from Amber
Steel and other subcontractors for the installation of reinforcing steel in
a wastewater treatment plant. C & K included Amber's bid in its
master bid, which ultimately was accepted by the public sanitation district, the proposed owner of the plant. After Amber refused to perform

in accordance with its bid on the subcontract, C & K brought an action
based on the theory of promissory estoppel to recover money damages
for Amber's alleged breach of contract.
C & K alleged that it reasonably relied on Amber's bid in submit-

ting its master bid and, when Amber refused to perform in accordance
with its bid, C & K was required to expend additional money to perform the reinforcing steel work. Amber maintained that its bid was the
result of an honest mistake in calculation and that C & K knew of the
mistake but failed to notify Amber or permit it to revise its bid as was
customary in the industry. Amber demanded a jury trial but the trial
court, deeming the case to be essentially in equity, denied the request.
The trial court, however, did empanel an advisory jury to consider the
* B.A., 1973, Brandeis University. Member, Second Year Class.
1. 23 Cal. 3d 1, 587 P.2d 1136, 151 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1978).
2. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has been defined by the RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 90 (1932) as follows: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise." This Note uses the terms "promissory estoppel" and "section 90" interchangeably. The California courts have adopted the Restatement
definition as a rule of law. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 413, 333 P.2d 757,
759 (1958); Saliba-Kringlen Corp. v. Allen Eng'r Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 95, 100, 92 Cal. Rptr.
799, 800-01 (1971); H.W. Stanfield Constr. Corp. v. Robert McMullan & Son, Inc., 14 Cal.
App. 3d 848, 852, 92 Cal. Rptr. 669, 671 (1971); Associated Creditors' Agency v. Haley Land
Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 610, 616, 49 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1966).
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issue of reasonable reliance. The advisory jury found that C & K reasonably relied to its detriment on Amber's bid. The trial court adopted
this finding and awarded C & K the usual contract measure of damages-the difference between what C & K was required to pay for the
work and what it would have paid had Amber fully performed on its
3
bid.
Amber appealed, contending that it was improperly denied a jury
trial under the California Constitution. Although the constitution declares that "[tirial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to
all,"'4 this provision has been interpreted by the California Supreme
Court to guarantee the right to trial by jury where the "gist of the action" is legal, but not where the "gist" is equitable. 5 The gist of the
action is legal if the same or a similar action existed at common law in
1850, when the California Constitution was adopted, or if it deals with
legal rights. 6 The court in C & K applied this test in affirming the trial
court opinion, 7 characterizing the "gist of the action" in a promissory
estoppel case as equitable rather than legal. 8 The dissent argued that in
determining the right to trial by jury California courts should focus not
on the gist of the action or the nature of the rights involved, but rather
on the remedies requested, and therefore a plaintiff who seeks damages
should be entitled to a jury trial.9
The majority briefly reviewed both the history and the current application of promissory estoppel and characterized it as "'a doctrine
which employs equitable principles to satisfy the requirement that consideration must be given in exchange for the promise sought to be enforced.'-10 In the opinion of the court damages for breach of a
promise not supported by consideration were available in equity but
not in law prior to 1850. Hence, historically the gist of a promissory
estoppel action had to be equitable. The court emphasized that the
principle of "avoidance of injustice," which it labeled an equitable
principle, is what renders a gratuitous promise enforceable under
3.
4.
5.
6.
statute:

23 Cal. 3d at 5-6, 587 P.2d at 1137-38, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 324-25.
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 231 P.2d 832 (1951).
Id. at 299-300, 231 P.2d at 843-44. The constitution also has been interpreted by
"In actions. . . for money claimed as due upon a contract ... an issue of fact must

be tried by a jury .... " CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 592 (West 1976). This statutory preference for jury trial in contract actions should have a strong bearing on the interpretation of
promissory estoppel as a contractual or equitable action.
7. 23 Cal. 3d at 9, 587 P.2d at 1140, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
8. Id. at 11, 587 P.2d at 1141, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
9. Id. at 14, 587 P.2d at 1143, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 330 (Newman, J. & Bird, C.J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 6, 587 P.2d at 1138, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 325 (quoting Raedeke v. Gibralter Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 10 Cal. 3d 665, 672, 517 P.2d 1157, 1161, 111 Cal. Rptr. 693, 697 (1974))

(emphasis by the court).

January 1980]

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

promissory estoppel. The court also found that discretion is fundamental to promissory estoppel actions, apparently in regard both to imposition of liability and assessment of damages. The use of discretion to
avoid injustice under the doctrine of promissory estoppel led the court
to conclude that the doctrine is equitable, not legal.I'
After reaching this conclusion, the court accordingly held that
there is no right to trial by jury in promissory estoppel actions. The
court did note that the mode of relief ordinarily determines the legal or
equitable nature of a cause of action and that equitable principles are
guides to courts of law as well as courts of equity. Nonetheless, the
court held that when the cause of action and the granting of relief depend upon the application of equitable doctrines 2there is no right to
jury trial no matter what form of relief is sought.'
This Note will demonstrate that there should be a right to jury trial
in promissory estoppel actions where damages are sought, both because
promissory estoppel should be considered a form of contract action and
because jury trial should be a matter of right whenever a plaintiff seeks
damages. In support of this contention, promissory estoppel and the
right to trial by jury each are analyzed comprehensively. First, the
court's determination that a promissory estoppel action is equitable
rather than legal is criticized. This criticism is premised on the notions,
developed in detail in the Note, that a promissory estoppel action is
legal because there was enforcement of gratuitous promises at common
law and, more significantly, that the analogy between promissory estoppel and contract actions is so strong as to require the former to be
considered a species of the latter. All of the major features of an action
in contract--definitions, rights and duties, consideration, and damages-are examined and analogized to their counterparts in promissory
estoppel. This analysis will demonstrate that the stages of a promissory
estoppel action are analyzed by courts and commentators in contract
terms and the nature of the rights that are created and enforced in contract are essentially the same as those in promissory estoppel.
The Note then turns to the "gist of the action" test, particularly as
used by the majority in C & K. The discussion focuses on the limitations of the test in distinguishing legal from equitable claims-failure
to accurately reflect the historical distinction between law and equity,
difficult application in a modern context, and the potential for circumscribing the constitutional right to trial by jury. Because of these
problems with the gist of the action test, this Note, in accordance with
the dissent in C & K, indicates that the remedy sought almost always
should determine the right to trial by jury. A claim for damages in a
11.
12.

23 Cal. 3d at 7-8, 587 P.2d at 1138-39, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 325-26.
Id. at 9, 587 P.2d at 1140, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
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promissory estoppel case therefore should guarantee the right to trial
by jury.

Promissory Estoppel
Historical Bases of the Doctrine
An examination of the origins of contract law reveals that the principles upon which promissory estoppel is based closely resemble those
that supported contract actions at early common law. The consensus
among authorities is that the initial basis for the enforcement of simple
contracts in the action of assumpsit was action or forbearance in justifiable reliance on a promise-rather than the more modem notion of
purchase of a promise for a price.13 The court in C & K acknowledges
this genesis of contract law but argues that by 1850 assumpsit would
not lie to enforce a gratuitous promise.' 4 Although during the nineteenth century the bargain concept was the dominant source of contractual liability, 15 contrary to the court's finding, liability based upon
detrimental reliance remained a credited, if little used, doctrine of contract law. Corbin writes that there have always been informal contracts
with no assent or consideration and that history was never inconsistent
6
with section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts.'
13.

See generally 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 140, at 618-19 n.6 (3d ed. 1957) [here-

inafter cited as WILLISTON]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, Comment a at

216 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973); Ames, The HistoryofAssumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1888)
(Part I); Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 53 (1888) (Part II); Fuller &
Perdue, The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 68 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Fuller & Perdue 1]: ("[tjhus in the early stages of its growth the action of assumpsit was clearly dominated by the reliance interest .... "); Henderson, Promissory
Estoppel and TraditionalContract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 345 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Henderson].
14. 23 Cal. 3d at 7, 587 P.2d at 1139, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 326. A gratuitous promise is a
"promise which is not in fact founded upon a bargained-for equivalent or 'a price requested
and received by the promisor for the promise.'" Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New
Writ?, 35 MICH. L. REV. 908, 909 n.4 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Shattuck].
15. "Faith in free enterprise reached its zenith in nineteenth-century America, which
placed its trust in the dignity and creativity of the individual and in the social utility of the
wealth that he produced. . . . The goal was a society in which decision making was widely
dispersed among its members .

. .

. The mechanism devised to achieve this goal centers

about transactions called 'exchanges,' in which each party gives something in return for
what is given by the other party. Under the market principle, equivalence in these exchanges is determined by the forces of supply and demand arising out of the productivity
and the value judgments of individuals. Their terms are arrived at voluntarily by the parties
themselves through the process referred to as 'bargain' by Adam Smith." Farnsworth, The
Pastof Promise." An HistoricalIntroduction to Contract,69 COLUM. L. REV. 576, 577 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Farnsworth].
16.

IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 194, at 192-97 (rev. ed. 1963) [hereinafter

cited as CORBIN]. In documenting its assertion that as of 1850 gratuitous promises were not
enforced at law the court takes several sources out of context. For example, Ames says that
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There were several specific fact patterns in which gratuitous
promises were enforced at early common law. Moreover, there is no
indication that actions based on these fact patterns were confined to
equity or that they had disappeared by 1850. The most historically sig-

nificant of these patterns involves the promise to perform a gratuitous
undertaking, which has been described by Professor Boyer as the prece-

dent for promissory estoppel.17 Cases of gratuitous undertakings have8
been cited as among the earliest sources for the action of assumpsit;1
the action consisted of the defendant undertaking to do something and

injuring the plaintiff by inducing reliance on the undertaking. 19 This
early doctrine received renewed impetus in the famous case of Coggs .

Bernard,20 in which Chief Justice Holt stated that the promisee's trust
in the promisor's undertaking can be sufficient consideration to support
a promise. 21 Subsequent cases both in England and the United States
this opinion as a basis for upholding contracts in similar siturelied on
22
ations.
Other instances in which gratuitous promises were enforced prior
to 1850 include promises under seal, 23 promises to make charitable sub-

scriptions, 24 and promises made out of moral obligation. 25 Both the
from 1531 "a detriment has always been deemed a valid consideration for a promise if incurred at the promisor's request." Ames, The History of-4ssumysit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14
(1888) (Part I). This statement simply describes one circumstance in which a promise was
enforced; the court jumps from it to an assertion that "as of 1850 assumpsit would not lie to
enforce a gratuitous promise, where the promisee's detrimental reliance was not requested
by the promisor." 23 Cal. 3d at 7, 587 P.2d at 326, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 326. Shattuck states:
"Anglo-American law starts from the premise that a promise creates no legal rights nor
duties when it is not supported by a bargained-for consideration. There is, however, a large
group of cases apparently not conforming to this rule." Shattuck, supra note 14, at 914. The
court in C & K ignores the latter sentence.
17. See Boyer, PromissoryEstoppel." PrincileFrom Precedents: I, 50 MICH. L. REV.
639, 668 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Boyer].
18. 1 WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 138, at 597.
19. Id See Beale, Gratuitous Undertakings, 5 HARV. L. REV. 222 (1892).
20. 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703).
21. Id. at 113. Commenting on this case, Boyer explains: "Here all of the elements of
the doctrine [of promissory estoppel] are present. There is a promise reasonably expected to
and which does induce an injurious reliance to the detriment of the promisee. Unless the
promise is enforced, the promisee will suffer undue hardship." Boyer, supra note 17, at 669.
22. See Shattuck, supra note 14, at 916 n.25.
23. IA CORBIN, supra note 16, § 252.
24. This class of cases is separable from the others because of its recent creation. In
1937 Shattuck wrote that these charitable subscription cases had been litigated only during
the past 125 years, but in the United States the promises are enforced to the letter as contracts. Shattuck, supra note 14, at 931. Because enforcement was rooted in public policy
considerations, id. at 932, these cases foreshadow promissory estoppel. See Boyer, supra
note 17, at 644-53. "Promissory estoppel probably received its first open recognition in connection with the enforcement of charitable subscriptions." Id. at 652.
25. Moral obligation has had a variety of meanings in legal history. A moral obliga-
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recognition of these fact patterns and the influence of the Coggs opinion suggest that enforcement of gratuitous promises was well established during the nineteenth century despite the prominence of the
bargain theory. Enforcement of these promises represented the foundation for promissory estoppel; hence, at the time of the adoption of the
constitution in 1850 no new theories were required to enforce a gratuitous promise in many situations. Consequently, the drafters of section
90 of the Restatement did not create a new right, but instead expanded
the coverage of existing theory by extracting the connecting principle
from a variety of situations and placing more emphasis on the injustice
itself than the specific circumstance in which it arose. The historical
status of promissory estoppel, although perhaps less than conclusive as
to the status of the doctrine, lends support to the proposition that promissory estoppel should be regarded as a contract action.
The Analogy Between Promissory Estoppel and Contract
Definitions

In addition to the historical connection between promissory estoppel and contract, judicial treatment of the two actions, as well as commentators' opinions, indicate their similarity. The leading authorities
unreservedly classify as contract a promise enforced because of justifiable detrimental reliance.2 6 At least one California Court of Appeal has
assumed that a contract results when the requirements of section 90 are
met. 27 Further, California has judicially adopted section 90 of the Retion generally refers to an implied in law obligation, although it is too often given the misnomer of "past consideration." See note 64 infra. Under Lord Mansfield, in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the concept magnified into a doctrine which could
support a promise by an appeal to moral and natural law. The Mansfield era brought English contract law closer than it has ever been to the civil law and consideration was nearly
reduced to little more than one item of evidence which could prove the existence of a contract. This Mansfield doctrine enjoyed an intense, although short-lived, popularity. Yet vestiges of it survived to support promises in two situations: when there was an unenforceable
precedent debt; and when an act had been done at the defendant's request. See I WILLISTON, supra note 13, §§ 142-149; Holdsworth, The Modern Historyof the Doctrine of Consideration, 2 B.U.L. REV. 87, 174, 186-95 (1922) (Parts I and 2).
26. See I WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 140, at 610-11; Henderson, supra note 13, at 380.
Corbin includes § 90 under the topic heading of Informal Contracts Without Mutual Assent
or Consideration. IA CORBIN, supra note 16, Topic C, at 187. These three writers, the chief
victims of the C & K court's cursory summation of authority, are all cited by the court in
support of its categorization of promissory estoppel as an equitable doctrine, rather than a
contract. 23 Cal. 3d at 7, 587 P.2d at 1138-39, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 325-26.
27. Swinerton & Walberg Co. v. City of Inglewood-L.A. County Civic Center Auth., 40
Cal. App. 3d 98, 103-04, 114 Cal. Rptr. 834, 837 (1974). Other rulings take a more circuitous
path to the same conclusion. In Blatt v. University of S. Cal., 5 Cal. App. 3d 935, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1970), for example, the court said a cause of action under promissory estoppel
requires an allegation of breach of contract. Id. at 944, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
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statement of Contracts, 28 both editions of which maintain that the section operates to create a contract. 29 Any court certainly is free to reject

the conclusions of the commentators and the Restatement, but the intimate historical and practical connection between the bases of liability
in contract and promissory estoppel nonetheless remains. The essence
of the common law definition of a contract is a promise the law will
enforce; 30 promissory estoppel is within this definition because it also is
based upon a promise the law will enforce in certain circumstances.
From a definitional viewpoint, the C & K court finds its lone support in the California Civil Code, in which a contract is defined as "an
agreement to do or not do a certain thing."'3 ' Promissory estoppel does
not conform to this definition as it does not involve an agreement. The
code definition is incomplete, however, because it is more restrictive
than the common law definition and because in practice the courts recognize that not all contracts are agteements. 32 Liability is imposed by
California courts not because there has been an agreement, but because
promises are made and broken 33-- the very basis of liability in promis-

sory estoppel. The element of section 90 upon which the California
courts have been most insistent is the existence of an unambiguous
promise; 34 this requirement has been used effectively to prevent abuse
of the doctrine. Hence, from a practical and historical viewpoint there
28. C & K Eng'r Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 23 Cal. 3d 1, 6, 587 P.2d 1136, 1138,
151 Cal. Rptr. 323, 325 (1978). See note 2 supra.
29. The first Restatement included § 90 within a heading entitled Informal Contracts
lithout Assent or Consideration. The second Restatement is more explicit: "A promise
binding under this section is a contract .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 90, Comment d at 217 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
30. Farnsworth, supranote 15, at 578 (quoting F. POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT
1 (12th ed. 1946)). See also 1A CORBIN, supra note 16, § 193, at 187. Professor Williston's
elaborate definition is probably the most influential in America: "A contract is a promise, or
set of promises, for breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the
law in some way recognizes as a duty." I WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 1, at 1. The RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1932) adopted this definition.
31. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1549 (West 1954).
32. CALAMARI & PERILLO, CONTRACTS § I-I, at 2 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
CALAMARI & PERILLO]. See also IA CORBIN, supra note 16, § 3, at 5-6. A promise enforced
because of "past" consideration is the most notable instance of a contract without agreement. See note 64 infra. Unilateral contracts do not require an agreement and are enforced
in California. For a discussion of unilateral contracts see Davis v. Jacoby, 1 Cal. 2d 370,
378, 34 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1934) (finding contract bilateral).
33. "If a cause of action arises from a breach of a promise, the action is contractual in
nature." L.B. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell, 39 Cal. 2d 56, 62, 244 P.2d 385, 388 (1952). See
also Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 419
(1937).
34. See, e.g, Southern Cal. Acoustics Co. v. C.V. Holder, Inc., 71 Cal. 2d 719, 723, 456
P.2d 975, 979,79 Cal. Rptr. 319, 323 (1969); Bard v. Kent, 19 Cal. 2d 449, 453, 122 P.2d 8, 10
(1942); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Hacienda Mobile Home Park, 45 Cal. App. 3d 519, 531,
119 Cal. Rptr. 559, 567 (1975). The Restatement of Contracts defines a promise as "an
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is nothing in the current definition of an action in contract to exclude
the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Rights and Duties

As the examination of contract and promissory estoppel goes from
definitions to the nature of the attendant rights and duties, the immediacy of the analogy becomes more convincing. Central to both contract
and promissory estoppel is the right to receive a promised performance;3 5 enforcement of rights in both actions is predicated on reliance
on the promise, either because of action or forbearance, or the promise
of action or forbearance, on the part of the promisee. 36 Debate focuses
not so much on whether the rights are similar but on whether they are
similar 37 or identical. 38
undertaking, however expressed, either that something shall happen, or that something shall
not happen, in the future." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1932).
35. This is in contrast to the right to be secure, which is the basis of tort liability. Shattuck, supra note 14, at 910 n.9. See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 92, at 613 (4th ed. 1971): "Tort actions are created to protect the interest in freedom from
various kinds of harm . .

.

. Contract actions are created to protect the interest in having

promises performed."
36. Fuller and Perdue identify three interests that contract law seeks to protect. The
reliance interest protects the promisee from potential harm caused by his or her change of
position. The restitution interest returns to the promisee the value which has unjustly enriched the promisor. The expectation interest gives the promisee the full value of what was
promised, in large part because he or she has forgone other opportunities. The reliance
interest is the crucial one; the other two interests embody and are particular manifestations
of the reliance interest. See Fuller & Perdue 1, supra note 13, at 53-75.
37. Shattuck is representative of those authorities who do not believe that promissory
estoppel necessarily creates a contract right, but his position is reconcilable with the analysis
presented in this Note. He states that promissory estoppel is somewhat of a hybrid between
tort and contract, "although more closely resembling the latter." Shattuck, supra note 14, at
942. Thus the right is essentially legal rather than equitable, even if not purely contractual.
Shattuck would not find a contract label objectionable except that this classification would
result in an expectation rather than reimbursement measure of damages. Id. at 942. Even
as to the distinction he wishes to draw based on damages, Shattuck concedes that the extent
of the promisor's responsibility "rests in contemporary concepts of morality and justice."
Id. at 943. More than forty years after Shattuck's article, contemporary morality generally
favors a contract measure of damages and courts have proved willing to administer reliance
damages where appropriate despite their conviction that promissory estoppel creates a contract. See note 114 & accompanying text supra. For a perspective resembling that of Shattuck see Seavy, Reliance Upon GratuitousPromisesor Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913
(1951).
38. "The detrimental reliance serves as a substitute for consideration, giving rise to a
contract right in the plaintiff." Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 649, 394
P.2d 571, 578, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731, 738 (1964). Williston was so committed to the identity of
contractual and promissory estoppel rights that he favored full enforcement of the promise
in every case of promissory estoppel. See Fuller & Perdue 1, supra note 13, at 64 n. 14.
Whether or not this unbending approach to damages is correct, see note 112 & accompanying text infra, the link remains between the right to damages in these actions.
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The court in C & K nonetheless distinguishes the rights on the

grounds that in promissory estoppel the right is created by a gratuitous
promise. 39 According to the court's position, it is therefore a weaker
right which should be enforced only at the discretion of an equity
court. Others have argued to the contrary, however, pointing out that
the promisee who has justifiably relied to his or her detriment on a

promise (as in promissory estoppel) may have a more legitimate right
is
to receive the promised performance than does the promisee who 40
in an executory bilateral contract).

merely awaiting an expectancy (as

In addition, as noted previously, the right in the former instance was
the first to be recognized at common law; executory bilateral contracts
were not enforced until the sixteenth century. 4 1 Corbin contends that

the contract right derives from the reasonable expectations of the promisee,42 a conclusion supported by the "expectation" measure of contract
damages. Under this approach, the gratuitous or bargained-for character of the promise would be unimportant provided the expectation was

reasonable, as it must be in promissory estoppel.
There is somewhat less similarity between the duties of the promis-

sory estoppel and contractual promisors than is the case with the rights
of the promisees in these actions. The duties can be distinguished on

two grounds: the duty of the promissory estoppel promisor is not voluntarily assumed through a process of mutual assent, but is imposed by
law, and this duty is "one-way" because the promisee has no return

obligation. These distinctions, however, are largely semantic. Although not arrived at through mutual assent the promissory estoppel
promisor's duty is consensual in the sense that it is directly and voluntarily assumed as to a particular promisee. 43 It is direct because it is not

owed to the world at large or to a class of foreseeable plaintiffs. 44 It is
voluntary because the duty is imposed only when the promisor has con39. 23 Cal. 3d at 6-8, 587 P.2d at 1139, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 325-26.
40. "In passing from compensation for change of position to compensation for loss of
expectancy we pass, to use Aristotle's terms again, from the realm of corrective justice to that
of distributive justice. The law no longer seeks merely to heal a disturbed status quo, but to
bring into being a new situation. It ceases to act defensively or restoratively, and assumes a
more active role. With the transition, the justification for legal relief loses its self-evident
quality." Fuller & Perdue I, supra note 13, at 56-57.
41. Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 595-96; Holdsworth, Debt, A4ssumpsit and Consideration, 11 MICH. L. REv. 347, 350 (1913).
42. The attempt to realize the reasonable expectations that have been induced by the
making of a promise is the axiomatic contract principle, and "an understanding of many of
the existing rules and a determination of their effectiveness require a lively consciousness of
this underlying purpose." 1 CORBIN, supra note 16, § 1, at 2.
43. Shattuck, supra note 14, at 941.
44. These are the tort theories of duty. See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339,
162 N.E. 99 (1928). Contract obligations are owed only to the individuals named in the
contract. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 92, at 613 (4th ed. 1971).
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sciously chosen to promise with actual knowledge of the consequences
or in circumstances in which the consequences should have been recognized.
This direct and voluntary relationship between the parties is distinctly contractual in that it centers around the private autonomy of the
parties 4 5-their power to effect changes in their legal relations without
governmental intervention. Notwithstanding the contractual nature of
the relationship, it would be illogical to afford the promisor the usual
defense that he or she has no potential gain, since the promisor has
promised explicitly to carry out an undertaking regardless of any gain
and should have foreseen that this promise would be relied upon to the
injury of the promisee in the event of its breach. The contention that
the obligation is noncontractual because its measure is imposed by law
also is devoid of merit. The obligation that the law "imposes" is never
greater than the obligation assumed but not carried out.
Case law minimizes the second purported dichotomy between the
duties of the promisor in promissory estoppel and contract. The duty
in promissory estoppel is considered "one-way" because of the lack of
mutuality of obligation. There are many exceptions to this mutuality
requirement in contract law, however, such as contracts voidable at the
48
47
option of one party, 46 unilateral contracts, and option contracts.
Thus, lack of mutuality of obligation need not preclude an action from
sounding in contract. In all of these exceptions, however, some exchange is contemplated and this is not a requirement in promissory
estoppel. The analogy is nonetheless significant because in practice, in
is made because the
most promissory estoppel situations, the promise
49
promisor expects some potential advantage.
The extent to which promissory estoppel is a departure from contract principles which value the private autonomy of the parties should
not be overlooked. The parties have not worked out an exchange mutually, so the precise terms imposed by the court to some extent supersede the intentions of the parties. Although in other contexts the courts
45.

The concept of private autonomy is sometimes referred to as the will theory of

contract. The desiderata are freedom of the individual and political decentralization. See
Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 806-10 (1941) [hereinafter cited as
Fuller].
46. E.g., Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971)

(power of minor to disaffirm contract).
47. Anchor Cas. Co. v. Surety Bond Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 204 Cal. App. 2d 175, 182-83,
22 Cal. Rptr. 278, 282 (1962). See also Bandoni v. Walston, 79 Cal. App. 2d 178, 183, 179
P.2d 365, 368 (1947).

48.

United States v. 70.39 Acres of Land, 164 F. Supp. 451, 468 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Hay-

ward Lumber & Inv. Co. v. Construction Prods. Corp., 117 Cal. App. 2d 221, 229, 225 P.2d

473, 478 (1953). Generally, however, the optionee has given something of value in exchange
for the option. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 32, § 37.
49.

See note 89 & accompanying text infra.
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have professed a willingness to infer terms without abandoning contract law, 50 promissory estoppel is a more radical departure from private autonomy because the court infers not only the essential terms but
the very existence of the contract. Although the obligation in promis-

sory estoppel involves exceptions to certain traditional concepts, it nevertheless is essentially consistent with the obligation to fulfill promises
that contract law imposes.5 ' The following discussion of consideration
will show that the duty in promissory estoppel actions also is consistent

with contemporary developments in contractual responsibility.
Consideration

The usual explanation as to why contract status is denied to

promises enforced because of promissory estoppel is that such promises
are deemed to be unsupported by consideration in the sense of bargained-for exchange. 5 2 In this view, only promises that have been paid

for merit full contract status. This contention, however, is not corroborated by'either past or present contract law as numerous exceptions to
the requirement of consideration have always existed.
Currently, the most widely accepted common law definition is a
benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee,5 3 a definition

that can encompass an action in promissory estoppel. The consideration doctrine developed as a means of amalgamating a variety of fact
patterns in which promises were enforced, 54 including promises en50. E.g., California Lettuce Growers, Inc. v. Union Sugar Co., 45 Cal. 2d 474,481,289
P.2d 787, 790 (1955) (the law "leans against the destruction of contracts because of uncertainty; and it will, if feasible, so construe agreements as to carry into effect the reasonable
intentions of the parties if that can be ascertained"). See also Forde v. Verbro Corp., 218
Cal. App. 2d 405, 407, 32 Cal. Rptr. 577, 578 (1963).
51. "The doctrine is framed with reference to contractual obligation ... it seems but
logical to apply it in accordance with the principles generally applicable to any contract
problem." Boyer, PromissoryEstoppel: Requirements and Limitations ofthe Doctrine, 98 U.
PA. L. REv. 459, 467 (1950) [hereinafter cited as PromissoryEstoppel].
52. See C & K Eng'r Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 23 Cal. 3d 1, 6, 587 P.2d 1136,
1138, 151 Cal. Rptr. 323, 325 (1978).
53. Anchor Cas. Co. v. Surety Bond Say. & Loan Ass'n, 204 Cal. App. 2d 175, 181, 22
Cal. Rptr. 278, 281 (1963); Blonder v. Gentile, 149 Cal. App. 2d 869, 875, 309 P.2d 147, 151
(1957); Southern Cal. Enterprises v. Walter & Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d 750, 760, 178 P.2d 785,
791 (1947); IA CORBIN, supra note 16, § 195, at 197; 1 WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 99, at
369.
The general acceptance of this definition belies a history which has been described as
"tortuous, confused and wrapped in controversy." CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 32,
§ 4-I, at 133. Moreover, Corbin has defined consideration as any factor held to make a
promise binding. I CORBIN, supranote 16, § 110, at 492. Farnsworth regards consideration
as nothing more than a word of art used to describe the sum of the necessary conditions for
an action to lie in assumpsit. Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 598.
54. Two quite different classes of cases led to the alternative definitions of consideration as a benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee. Generally, in the first class of
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forced because of events occurring prior to, contemporaneous with, or
subsequent to the making of the promise. 55 Only the second category

qualifies as an exchange, although it does represent the majority of
cases. Not until the late nineteenth century can any doctrinal rule be
found that the promise and the detriment must be mutual inducements. 56 The Restatement of Contracts adopted this narrow definition

of consideration as something bargained for and given in exchange for

a promise, 57 but then devoted ten sections
to describe what other fac58

tors will make a promise enforceable.

As this history demonstrates, consideration has not been synonymous with bargain, but potentially and actually has been more inclusive. Despite this history the statutory rule defining consideration in
California is that the detriment must induce the promise. 59 As has happened throughout history, however, there has been a need in California
either to find alternative justifications for enforcement of promises or to
cases, the precedent debt which originally arose in consequence of some benefit received by
the defendant made the defendant's promise enforceable. In the second and older class of
cases, the action stemmed from an injury to the plaintiff caused by entrusting his or her
person or property to the defendant in reliance on the latter's promise or undertaking. See 1
WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 99, at 367-69. See generally Ames, The History ofAssumpsit, 2
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1888) (Part I); Ames, The HistoryofAssumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 53 (1888)
(Part II); Farnsworth, supra note 15; Holdsworth, Debt, Assumpsit and Consideration, 11
MICH. L. REV. 347 (1913).

55. 1 CORBIN, supra note 16, § 110, at 494.
56. Certain famous pronouncements by Holmes led to the presumption that there is no
binding promise without a bargain: "The root of the whole matter is the relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other, between consideration and promise." 0.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 293-94 (1881).

Later this idea was phrased as: "It is not

enough that the promise induces the detriment or that the detriment induces the promise if
the other half is wanting." Wisconsin & Mich. Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386 (1903). This
opinion did not fully represent the development of the law, as Holmes had admitted earlier:
"There must be some ground for saying that the acts done in reliance upon the promise were
contemplated by the form of the transaction either impliedly or in terms as the conventional
inducement, motive and equivalent for the promise. But courts have gone very great lengths
in discovering the implication of such an equivalence, sometimes perhaps even having found
it in matters which would seem to be no more than conditions or natural consequences of
the promise." Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114, 117, 60 N.E. 397, 398 (1901).
57. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 75 (1932). The second Restatement is almost
apologetic about this definition. It remarks that consideration often is given different meanings. "It is often used merely to express the legal conclusion that a promise is enforceable. . . [or] to refer to almost any reason asserted for enforcing a promise." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75, Comment a at 149-50 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
58. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, §§ 85-94 (1932).
59. "[A]ny benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred, upon the promisor, by any
other person, to which the promisor is not lawfully entitled, or any prejudice suffered, or
agreed to be suffered, by such person, other than such as he is at the time of consent lawfully
bound to suffer, as an inducement to the promisor, is a good consideration for a promise."
CAL. Civ. CODE § 1605 (West 1954).
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stretch the definition of consideration. 60 If executed in a writing no
consideration is needed in California for a release, 6 1 for a waiver of the
statute of limitations, 6 2 or for modification of an oral contract. 63 A
moral obligation also may support a promise, at least where there was
previously a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. 64
reliMoreover, California courts have held that justifiable detrimental
65
ance is consideration, or a "substitute" for consideration.
In light of these numerous exceptions, the requirement of consid60. Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 10 Cal. 3d 665, 672, 517 P.2d 1157, 1161,
I I Cal. Rptr. 693, 697 (1974) (substitute for consideration); Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem.
Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 649, 394 P.2d 571, 578, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731, 738 (1964) (detrimental reliance serves as a substitute for consideration); Wade v. Markwell & Co., 118 Cal. App. 2d
410, 419, 258 P.2d 497, 502 (1953) (promissory estoppel recognized as a species of consideration or a substitute for consideration). In Raedeke, the court conceded that there is some
basis for holding that promissory estoppel is an action at law. 10 Cal. 3d at 674 n.4, 517 P.2d
at 1162, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
61. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1541 (West 1954).
62. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 360.5 (West 1954).
63. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1697 (West Supp. 1978). See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) ("[a]n agreement
modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding").
64. "An existing legal obligation resting upon the promisor, or a moral obligation
originating in some benefit conferred upon the promisor, or prejudice suffered by the promisee, is also a good consideration for a promise, to an extent corresponding with the extent of
the obligation, but no further or otherwise." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1606 (West 1954). See, e.g.,
Davison v. Anderson, 125 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 908, 910, 271 P.2d 233, 235 (1954). See also
Medberry v. Olcovich, 15 Cal. App. 2d 263, 59 P.2d 551 (1936). In Medberry the court
decided that a promise made to the father of an injured minor that the promisor would take
care of reasonable medical expenses resulting from the accident caused by his own child was
based on a moral obligation on the part of the promisor and was supported by a good
consideration where the father of the injured child relied on such promise and incurred
expenses on the strength of it. This case is interesting because it contains elements both of
moral obligation and promissory estoppel enforcement based on events which occurred
before and after, but not simultaneously with, the making of the promise. Moral obligation
is sometimes given the self-contradictory label of "past consideration" and almost always is
used in that sense. The "past consideration" which supports moral obligations in California
is really not consideration at all. There was once detriment to the promisee, but the promise
was not made to obtain that detriment. See IA CORBIN, supra note 16, § 210, at 273-75; 1
WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 142, at 620-24.
65. See note 60 supra. A final exception to the consideration requirement, no longer
specifically applied by California courts, is the statutory provision stating that consideration
or "cause" is sufficient to support a promise. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1550 (West 1954). Cause
was the basis for enforcement of promises under Roman law and survives in variegated
forms in civil law countries. See 1 CORBIN, supra note 16, § I11, at 495; von Mehren, CivilLaw Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in ComparativeAnalysis, 72 HARV. L. REV.
1009 (1959). Any kind of justification for a contract which can be inferred-pecuniary,
moral, or even just a motive-will suffice as cause. See Chloros, The Doctrine of Consideralion and the Reform ofthe Law of Contract,4 ComparativeAnalysis, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
137, 146 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Chloros]; Keyes, Causeand Considerationin CalforniaA Re-Appraisal,47 CALIF. L. REv. 74, 99 (1959). Dissatisfaction with some of the formalisms of contract law has brought changes in areas other than consideration. There is increased flexibility in enforcement of the parol evidence rule, the plain meaning rule, the
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eration ought not to be enforced unless it serves a function unfulfilled
by other aspects of an action-in this instance promissory estoppel. An
examination of the reasons for the existence of a consideration requirement will clarify why promissory estoppel should be brought within the
realm of contract. The ensuing discussion assesses the functions performed by the formal and substantive requirements of the consideration doctrine and illustrates how the requirements of the promissory
estoppel doctrine perform the same functions.
Two functions are served by the requirement that the parties to a
contract comply with the formalities of consideration. These functions
have been termed "cautionary" and "evidentiary. '' 66 The cautionary
function acts as a restraining influence; it screens promises made im67
pulsively because legal consequences may not have been intended.
This function is accomplished by the requirements of promissory estoppel which impose liability on the promisor only when a reasonable person in the same situation would foresee injurious reliance on the
promise. Liability thus is not imposed for breach of impulsive
promises made under circumstances in which legal consequences are,
or should be, unexpected.
The evidentiary function of consideration might be the crux of the
entire doctrine; it supplies evidence to the court that a contract was in
fact made.6 8 What distinguishes the situations where courts did intervene at early common law is that something more than an informal
verbal or written exchange actually transpired between the parties; either there was a ceremonious writing, or the defendant made a promise
and caused actual injury to the plaintiff by breaching it, or the defendant had been enriched by the plaintiff. Currently, in a contract action
the detriment to the promisee or benefit to the promisor operates to
show the existence of the contract. Moreover, several current exceptions to the consideration requirement exemplify the prominent position that the evidentiary function has retained. In California a writing
Statute of Frauds, and consumer warranties. See Macaulay, Justice Traynor andthe Law of
Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REv. 812 (1961). See notes 74-79 & accompanying text infra.

66. Fuller, supra note 45, at 800. Fuller also mentions a channeling function. Less
frequently discussed than the other two functions, channeling involves fitting activity into
specific legal categories. Id. at 801-03.
67. Id. at 800.
68. Id. This function helps explain several peculiarities in the development of contract
law: (I) The development of liability for malfeasance well before that for nonfeasance, see
Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 594-95; see also Boyer, supra note 17, at 669 (delivery of
chattel to promisor makes the nature of the reliance capable of demonstration and evidences
the particular trust reposed in the defendant); (2) delay of the enforcement of the purely
executory bilateral contract until the sixteenth century, see note 41 & accompanying text
supra; (3) the development of the actions of covenant and debt prior to special assumpsit,
Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 593-96.
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is presumptive evidence of consideration in all instances, 69 and, as
noted, if there has been a writing no consideration is needed for a release, waiver of the statute of limitations, or modification of an oral
contract. 70 Similarly, under the Uniform Commercial Code a firm of7
fer (one which is irrevocable) requires no consideration if in writing. '
Hence, once the evidentiary function is fulfilled, traditional consideration becomes relatively unimportant.
A bargain serves the evidentiary function well because the process
of mutual assent and the purchase of the promise for a price indicate
that a contract probably was made. 72 But promissory estoppel also provides the court with sufficient evidentiary grounds for upholding a contract because of the need for a clear promise and actual reliance. Proof
of these elements is in all likelihood a sufficiently stringent requirement
to prevent the unwarranted invocation of the promissory estoppel doctrine.
The substantive basis for the existence of a consideration requirement involves a policy decision. The problem is to separate those
promises that ought to be enforced because of their value to society
from those which are of limited social utility. Promises within the context of an exchange, and which consequently satisfy the consideration
requirement, are the most worthy of enforcement because the legal relations are created freely and independently by the parties and because
73
the stability of our economic order depends on bargain promises.
However, the extension of liability to promises that induce reliance is
consistent with other changes in modem contract law that also recognize fairness as a substantive basis of contractual liability. This change
of values in the enforcement of promises is exhibited in judicial initiative to prevent fraud 74 or duress, 75 to protect the reasonable expectations of consumers injured by adhesion contracts, 76 to avoid the harsh
69. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1614 (West 1954).
70. See notes 61-63 & accompanying text supra.
71. U.C.C. § 2-205.
72. This may be one reason why nominal consideration suffices as proof of a bargain,
in lieu of an exchange of equivalencies which a true bargain entails. In Blonder v. Gentile,
149 Cal. App. 2d 869, 875, 309 P.2d 147, 151 (1957), the court stated that the validity of the
consideration does not depend upon its value, as the law does not ordinarily weigh its quantum. But see Blatt v. University of S. Cal., 5 Cal. App. 3d 935, 944, 85 Cal. Rptr. 601, 607
(1970).
73. Legal enforcement of promises which work an exchange has contributed dramatically to the expansion of a credit economy. See Fuller & Perdue I, supra note 13, at 57-63.
Moreover, they foster expectations of profit which our moral sense will not allow to be disappointed. Id. at 57.
74. See Leary v. Baker, 119 Cal. App. 2d 106, 258 P.2d 1090 (1953).
75. See Dawson, Economic Duress-4n Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253
(1947).
76. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263,419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
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effects of mistake, 77 and to eliminate unconscionable contracts. 78 The
desire generally is to promote "good faith and fair dealing. ' 79 Fairness
probably has always been a substantive basis of contract law, whether
or not mentioned as such. When courts allow almost any change in the
promised performance to waive the pre-existing duty rule80 and assert
that they will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration in the absence of fraud or duress, 8' they are showing more interest in facilitating
the economic plans of the parties than in holding them to abstruse theories of exchange.
Affording contract status to promissory estoppel would not acknowledge the principle of fairness for its own sake, but would invigorate traditional contract principles, as these other variations on the
bargain theory have done. Section 45 of the Restatement of Contracts
is a cogent illustration of why principles of fairness and bargain complement one another as substantive bases of contract law. This section
requires the promisor to hold open the offer for a unilateral contract
once the promisee has begun to perform.8 2 The promisor did not bargain for part performance, but fairness requires that revocation of the
promise not be allowed at that stage. The principle is the same as that
in promissory estoppel: the promisor may be compelled to pay for the
detriment induced by the promise, whether or not that detriment was
what was wanted. 83 The effect of section 45 is to stimulate the formation of unilateral contracts because the promisee can safely avoid the
manifest danger that always arises in such a transaction. A correlative
See also Patterson, The Interpretationand Constructionof Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833
(1964).

77. See Williams v. Puccinelli, 236 Cal. App. 2d 512, 46 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1965).
78. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
U.C.C. § 2-302.
79. See Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198,
200 (1958).
80. The pre-existing duty rule holds that no consideration exists when one party
promises a payment in return for a promise of another to do what that other was already
obligated to do. See I CORBIN, supra note 16, § 143, at 616-17. The compromise of even a
doubtful claim asserted and maintained in good faith constitutes a sufficient consideration
for a new promise, even though ultimately it may be found that the claimant could not have
prevailed. Khasigian v. Arakelian, 180 Cal. App. 2d 10, 14, 4 Cal. Rptr. 148, 151 (1960).
81. See McFadden v. Mitchell, 54 Cal. 628, 629-30 (1880).
82. "If an offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part of the consideration requested in the offer is given or tendered by the offeree in response thereto, the offeror is
bound by a contract, the duty of immediate performance of which is conditional on the full
consideration being given or tendered within the time stated in the offer, or, if no time is
stated therein, within a reasonable time." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1932). Section 45 is discussed by Justice Traynor in Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 414,
333 P.2d 757, 759-60 (1958). A case decided on a practically identical principle is Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654, 67 P. 1086 (1902).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
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effect, allowing promisees to rely on explicit promises, derives from actions based on promissory estoppel.
This correlation between section 45 and promissory estoppel suggests that the substantive basis for promissory estoppel is not as dissimilar to the bargained-for promise as it superficially appears. The
protection made available by promissory estoppel is a stimulant to
commercial activity because it encourages reliance on promises and
motivates promisors to keep their promises.8 4 The courts are cognizant
of this utility of promissory estoppel in business transactions; in fact,
the primary application of the doctrine has been in bargain settings
where an exchange was contemplated.8 5 The promise to pay a pension
is a typical example of this situation; the promise is not gratuitous but is
often made to induce the employee to remain at the job.86 Thus the

doctrine has grown from a rule which originally was thought to cover
only purely gratuitous promises to a rule potentially applicable in commercial dealings.
Surprisingly, the California Supreme Court has attempted to circumscribe the principle of fairness as a substantive basis of contractual
liability by limiting the application of promissory estoppel in exchange
contexts. In Healy v. Arewster,8 7 the court declared that promissory estoppel is inapplicable where the promisee's performance was requested
by the promisor at the time the promise was made.88 The Hlealy rule is
ironic because the California courts, which to some extent have not
applied the rule, 9 have led other jurisdictions in the application of
promissory estoppel to bargain situations. The seminal decision of
Drennan v. Star Paving Co. 90 led to the adoption of section 89(B)(2) of

the second Restatement 9' which is directed specifically at the promise
84. By preventing the unjust harms that can result from reliance, contract law is a catalyst to the risk taking that is an indispensible feature of our economic system. Protection of
the reliance interest, therefore, supplements and reinforces the principles upon which bargain theory is grounded. See generally Fuller, supra note 45, at 811; Fuller & Perdue I,
sufpra note 13, at 61.
85. Henderson, supra note 13, at 344.
86. See Van Hook v. Southern Cal. Waiters Alliance, 158 Cal. App. 2d 556, 323 P.2d
212 (1958) (promise of retirement benefits). See also West v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 101 Cal.
App. 2d 597, 225 P.2d 978 (1951) (promise to pay officer stated pension on retirement);
Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 197 P.2d 807 (1948) (promise of retirement allowance).
87. 59 Cal. 2d 455, 380 P.2d 817, 30 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1963).
88. [d. at 463, 380 P.2d at 821, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
89. The two largest classes of promissory estoppel cases contradict the Healy rule. The
pension cases have not been overruled since Heal,. The subcontractor cases (of which C &
K is one) contravene the Healy rule even more blatantly than the pension cases. See notes
90-95 & accompanying text infra.
90. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
91. "An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and which does
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which seeks a return. 92 The extension of promissory estoppel to baras
gain settings resulted from the logical observation that there can be
93
much injustice in a commercial as in a noncommercial situation. 94It
also was realized that the purely gratuitous promise is rare indeed.
Drennan draws attention to the need for promissory estoppel in
bargains and to the difficulty of finding a wholly gratuitous promise.
Justice Traynor's language exposes the defendant's covert request for
the plaintiff's performance:
Though defendant did not bargain for this use of its bid neither did
defendant make it idly, indifferent to whether it would be used or
not. On the contrary it is reasonable to suppose that defendant submitted its bid to obtain the subcontract. . . .It was to its own interest that the contractor be awarded the general contract ...
[C]learly defendant had a stake in plaintiffs reliance on its bid. 95
It is both futile and undesirable to categorically segregate the bargain
promise from the gratuitous promise and limit promissory estoppel to
the latter. Healy therefore represents one infelicitous attempt by the
California Supreme Court unnecessarily to limit fairness as a basis of
contract law. 96 C & K is another unfortunate attempt by the court to
induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to
avoid injustice." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(B)(2) (Tent. Drafts Nos.
1-7, 1973).
92. Henderson, supra note 13, at 368. "An offer is only one type of promise-the type
which is found when the transaction is cast in the context of a bargain and exchange .. "
Promissory Estoppel,supra note 5 1, at 469. Stated more formally, "[a]n offer is an expression by one party of his assent to certain definite terms, provided that the other party involved in the bargaining transaction will likewise express his assent to the identically same
terms." 1 CORBIN, supra note 16, § 11, at 23.
93. Promissory Estoppel,supra note 51, at 492.
94. It is a gross simplification to assume a clean split between those promises which are
legally binding and those which are without legal effect. The commercial or noncommercial
quality of an agreement is a matter of degree. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in
ContractDamages- 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 396 (1937).
95. 51 Cal. 2d at 415, 333 P.2d at 760.
96. The Healy rule is surprising because it is opposed to the major trends in the doctrine and restricts the application of promissory estoppel more than was contemplated by
those who drafted § 90. "The breadth of statement of § 90 has facilitated movement of
reliance theory into the realm of bargain." Henderson, supra note 13, at 353. Promissory
estoppel has become an accepted basis of liability in such areas as firm offers, the granting of
franchises, and precontractual negotiations in general. See Comment, Once More Into the
Breach: PromissoryEstoppel and TraditionalDamageDoctrine, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 559, 562
(1970). The Healy rule may express a fear that promissory estoppel will be applied indiscriminately or that it will be confused with the traditional bargain contract. But in view of
the intrinsic restrictions worked into the definition, the danger of misuse is minor. There has
been so little evidence of unwarranted invocation of the doctrine, despite the expanded application, that the second Restatement of Contracts has deleted the requirement that reliance
be definite and substantial. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Tent. Drafts
Nos. 1-7, 1973). The second Restatement also substantially broadens the scope of § 90 by
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limit the principle of fairness, in this instance by denying contract status to promissory estoppel actions.
Damages

An objection to contract status for promissory estoppel often emanates from the supposed distinction in the measure of damages. If
noteworthy differences exist, they are more a matter of theory than
practice. The policy of the California courts in promissory estoppel
cases is to award contract damages-the amount which would place the
plaintiff in the position he or she would have been in had the defendant
fully performed the promise.97 The award of contract damages in
Drennan and C & K did not provoke the slightest discussion in either
case. Justice Tobriner, in Tomerlin v. Canadian Indemnity Co.,98 ex-

plained that in promissory estoppel cases, "the appropriate remedy lies
in the enforcement of the defendant's promise." 99 Justice Tobriner
concluded that while there are other possible damage measures, a different approach, based on tort rather than contract, would be inequitable.100
The court in C & K contrasts damages awarded in promissory estoppel actions with other measures of contract recovery on the basis of
a proposed addition to section 90, which states that "[tihe remedy
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires."101 The court
interprets this sentence, as a result of the discretion it implies, to mean
that damages are based upon equitable principles. 10 2 This conclusion
is misleading, however. In a comment, the Second Restatement notes
that even though a promise binding under section 90 is a contract and
full scale enforcement by normal remedies often is appropriate, relief
sometimes may be limited to restitution or to damages or specific relief
measured by the extent of the promisee's reliance 10 3 rather than by the
terms of the promise.'04
explicitly affording protection to third parties. This extension is recognized in California.
See Aronowicz v. Nalley's, Inc., 30 Cal. App. 3d 27, 44-45, 106 Cal. Rptr. 424, 435 (1972).
97. This is the "benefit of the bargain" rule. See Coughlin v. Blair, 41 Cal. 2d 587, 603,
262 P.2d 305,314 (1953); Winegar v. Gray, 204 Cal. App. 2d 303, 314, 22 Cal. Rptr. 301, 308
(1962).
98. 61 Cal. 2d 638, 394 P.2d 571, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1964).
99. Id. at 649, 394 P.2d at 578, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
100. Id. at 649-50, 394 P.2d at 578, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 738. California's preference for
contract damages in promissory estoppel actions is not new. See Note, PromissoryEstoppel
in California, 5 STAN. L. REv. 783, 795 (1953).
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
102. 23 Cal. 3d at 8, 587 P.2d at 1139, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
103. Reliance damages (sometimes called reimbursement or out-of-pocket damages) attempt to put the plaintiff in the position he or she was in before the promise was made.
Fuller & Perdue 1, supra note 13, at 54.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, Comment d at 217-18 (Tent. Drafts
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To state that the measure of damages may be limited is simply to
state a well recognized contract principle; under present law trial courts
have wide discretion in determining the amount of damages to award
for breach of contract. 0 5 Moreover, neither California decisions nor
the Restatement grant courts in promissory estoppel actions liberty to
apply any measure which seems proper; 10 6 many of the general damage
standards in promissory estoppel are the same as those in contract. In
fact, in one promissory estoppel case a court of appeal held that a trial

court has no discretion to apportion the loss on the basis of the equities.107 The debate over promissory estoppel damages, begun with the
first Restatement and stimulated by the second Restatement, is not
whether damages should be discretionary, but whether they should be
measured exclusively by reliance' 0 8 or by contract standards.10 9 Accordingly, the Second Restatement comment need not be read to imply
Nos. 1-7, 1973). The possibility of restitution damages is virtually nonexistent. If the promisor was enriched by the promisee, the suit would be in the form of a traditional bargain
contract or in quasi-contract. The matter of discretion therefore is reduced to a choice between reliance and expectation damages.
105. See, e.g., Distillors Distrib. Corp. v. J.C. Millett Co., 310 F.2d 162, 165 (9th Cir.
1962); Csordas v. United Slate Tile Roofers, 177 Cal. App. 2d 184, 186, 2 Cal. Rptr. 133,
134-35 (1960). See also Mandoyoma, Inc. v. County of Mendocino, 8 Cal. App. 3d 873, 881,
87 Cal. Rptr. 740, 745 (1970) (reliance damages awarded); Milton v. Hudson Sales Corp.,
152 Cal. App. 2d 418, 436, 313 P.2d 936, 947 (1957) (one who breaches a contract cannot
escape liability on account of the difficulty of devising a perfect measure of damages for the
injury that the wrong has produced). As these cases indicate, there are numerous exceptions
to the "normal" rule of contract damages. Fuller & Perdue 1, supra note 13, at 53.
106. The introduction of a new contract rule gave the drafters of the second Restatement
an opportunity to make explicit some of the factors which influence normal contract damages. The comment discussed above is based upon a treatise by Fuller and Perdue, who
maintain that there should not be a fixed rule of contract damages. These writers also argue
that the key premise of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854), is "that it is not
always wise to make the defaulting promisor pay for all the damage which follows as a
consequence of his breach." Fuller & Perdue 1, supra note 13, at 77, 84. Hadley remains the
definitive case on the modem law of contract damages. The ruling limits damages to those
which the promisor should have foreseen at the time the contract was entered into. See 11
WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 1356, at 289.
107. Saliba-Kringlen Corp. v. Allen Eng'r Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 95, 111, 92 Cal. Rptr.
799, 808 (1971).
108. See Shattuck, supra note 14, at 942. See also Seavy, Reliance Upon Gratuitous
Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913 (1951): "The wrong is not primarily in
depriving the plaintiff of the promised reward but in causing the plaintiff to change position
to his detriment." Id. at 926.
109. Henderson, supra note 13, at 379: "[Ildentification with contract doctrine is indeed
essential if promissory estoppel is to be broadly accepted as a vehicle for protecting the
expectation interest." See also Note, PromissoryEstoppel-Measureof Damages, 13 VAND.
L. REV. 705, 709-12 (1960) (promissory estoppel actions should involve the same measure as
in contract actions). Several authorities favor a contract standard which allows for variance
to fit unusual cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, Comment d at 21718 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973); IA CORBIN, supra note 16, § 205.
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that the potential for limiting damages calls for the exercise of powers
available only in equity.
If the supreme court wishes to adopt more flexible remedies it can
find sufficient justification in principles of law without any resort to
equity. Hadley v. Baxendale"I0 is an example of discretion in legal actions; it mitigates the rigid approach to contract damages which, at least
in theory, prevailed at common law. 1 ' Along these lines, Professor
Corbin explains the historical discretionary power possessed by courts
at law:
The fact is that the courts of common law had as much power over
their money judgments as did the courts of Chancery... they exercised as great control over the amount of money awarded as damages
for breach ....
[The courts] can properly justify their actions by an appeal to
their equitable powers inherited from the Chancellor; but it is believed that such an appeal is unnecessary. The courts are still courts
of justice; and justice, though not dependent on the length of the
Chancellor's foot, has always been dependent on the circumstances
true with respect to the form
of the individual case. This is especially 112
and extent of the remedy to be applied.
This discretion, long recognized and exercised, strongly suggests that
courts of law are well equipped to apply section 90, including the proposed amendment. If the general policy of the California courts is to
apply a contract measure of damages, then promissory estoppel should
be brought within contract law. Commentators who argue that promissory estoppel should be separated from contract do so not because they
believe the two actions are dissimilar, but because they favor damages
measured by reimbursement. Generally, it is the earlier commentators
who favor a reliance measure; those who have witnessed the expansion
of the doctrine favor contractual measures.
Finally, if in a few cases promissory estoppel damages are measured other than by the expectation interest, this does not mean the
action is noncontractual. The overriding goal of contract damages is to
compensate the plaintiff; 13 this usually, but not necessarily," 4 results
in expectation damages. Moreover, the award of expectation damages
110. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). See note 106 supra.
111. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 138, at 563-64 (1935):
"[O]ne who failed to carry out his contract was, so far as legal theory went, liable for any
and all resulting loss sustained by the other party, however unforeseeable such loss may
have been." In practice, however, the approach to contract damages was rather flexible. See
note 112 & accompanying text infra.
112. IA CORBIN, supra note 16, § 205, at 236.
113. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (West 1970) (measurement of damages by compensatory amount).
114. See, e.g., Swinerton & Walberg Co. v. City of Inglewood-L.A. County Civic Center
Auth., 40 Cal. App. 3d 98, 104-05, 114 Cal. Rptr. 834, 837-38 (1974).
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as compensation can only approximate a plaintiffs estimated loss, since
the plaintiff never had that which the law considers necessary for com-

pensation. 115 By bringing promissory estoppel within contract law,
these sometimes arbitrary reasons underlying contract damages would
be subject to greater scrutiny and perhaps be made more equitable. At
the same time, courts would be less reluctant to award promissory estoppel plaintiffs expectation damages where they are deserved.
Promissory Estoppel and Equitable Estoppel
With labels so much alike it is easy to see why promissory estoppel
and equitable estoppel are still sometimes discussed as if they are slight
variations of the same legal principles. The court in C & K stresses this
connection in support of its classification of promissory estoppel as equitable by comparing a promissory estoppel action to an action based
upon the analagous principle of equitable estoppel.l 6 This analogy becomes central to the court's decision as the latter may be tried by the
court without a jury.1 17 An examination of the components of the doctrines reveals, however, that the analogy is less direct than it seems.
An equitable estoppel must involve a false statement or concealment 1 8 as to present or past facts. 1 9 In contrast, promissory estoppel
210
only arises if there is an explicit promise pertaining to the future.
2
Equitable estoppel is used defensively to maintain the status quo;' '
promissory estoppel creates an affirmative contract right. 22 Promissory estoppel is used in reference to the formation of a contract; equitable estoppel pertains to the performance of a contract. 2 3 Equitable
estoppel is not favored by the law because it prevents assertion of the
115. Expectation damages are awarded, at least in part, because they can be ascertained
with greater certainty, they are most likely to compensate the plaintiff's reliance, and they
deter carelessness by severely punishing the promisor. Fuller & Perdue 1,supra note 13, at
60-61. If these policies, all of which figure heavily in promissory estoppel cases, can sometimes be accomplished best by applying alternative damage measures, there seems no reason
not to do so.
116. 23 Cal. 3d at 9, 587 P.2d at 1140, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
117. Id. The court failed to mention that equitable estoppel is available in actions at
law as well as in equity. See City of Culver City v. State Bd. of Equalization, 29 Cal. App.
3d 404, 411, 105 Cal. Rptr. 602, 606 (1972); Moss v. Bluemm, 229 Cal. App. 2d 70, 72-73, 40
Cal. Rptr. 50, 52 (1964).
118. Silence also may suffice. See McGranahan v. Rio Vista School Dist., 224 Cal. App.
2d 624, 630, 36 Cal. Rptr. 798, 802 (1964); Bruce v. Jefferson Union High School Dist., 210
Cal. App. 2d 632, 634, 26 Cal. Rptr. 762, 763-64 (1962).
119. Blos v. Bankers Life Co., 133 Cal. App. 2d 147, 152, 283 P.2d 744, 747 (1955);
Berverdor, Inc. v. Salyer Farms, 97 Cal. App. 2d 459, 464, 218 P.2d 138, 142 (1950).
120. See note 34 & accompanying text supra.
121. McKee v. Peterson, 214 Cal. App. 2d 515, 529, 29 Cal. Rptr. 742, 751 (1963).
122. See Meyer v. Glenmoor Homes, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 2d 242, 267, 54 Cal. Rptr. 786,
803 (1966).
123. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 32, § 11-34, at 445.
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truth; 124 there is no such policy against the use of promissory estoppel.

Finally, absent culpable negligence, 25 the defendant in equitable estoppel cases must have actual or virtual knowledge of the falsity of his
or her representations' 26 and must intend that the plaintiff rely
thereon; 127 the standard of conduct of the promissory estoppel defendant is much closer to that of the breaching contractual promisor: negligence or bad faith are irrelevant and he or she need not have intended
to deceive the plaintiff.
As this listing of requirements indicates, the conduct of the parties
in promissory estoppel actions can be evaluated more effectively by the
objective theory of contracts. The issues are whether the promisor
should have reasonably foreseen reliance and whether the promisee
was reasonable in relying; in equitable estoppel the issues concern the
fraud' 28 of one party and the clean hands of the other. 129 In addition,
an analysis of the three authorities relied on by the court in C & K
shows that these authorities likewise viewed promissory and equitable
estoppel as distinct concepts which should be treated differently.
Professor Williston first popularized the term promissory estoppel,
but he did not emphasize its connection with estoppel theory. 130 And,
although he was responsible for section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts, that section does not employ the term at all.' 3 ' The second authority, Corbin, is cited by the C & K court for the proposition that one
of the132sources of promissory estoppel is flexible use of estoppel in equity, a dubious source of support as Corbin objected to the phrase
promissory estoppel altogether because of the connection with estoppel
doctrine which it implied.' 33 Furthermore, the C & K opinion relies
heavily on a treatise by Professor Henderson for its conclusion that
124. See Landberg v. Landberg, 24 Cal. App. 3d 742, 758-59, 101 Cal. Rptr. 335, 346
(1972).
125. McKee v. Peterson, 214 Cal. App. 2d 515, 524, 29 Cal. Rptr. 742, 748 (1963).
126. See Martin v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 52 Cal. 2d 287, 292, 341
P.2d 296, 299 (1959); Interinsurance Exch. v. Veiji, 44 Cal. App. 3d 310, 319, 118 Cal. Rptr.
596, 602 (1975); Meyer v. Glenmoor Homes, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 2d 242, 264, 54 Cal. Rptr.
786, 801 (1966).
127. Skinner v. Sillas, 58 Cal. App. 3d 591, 597, 130 Cal. Rptr. 91, 94 (1976).
128. See Burgess v. California Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 210 Cal. 180, 189, 290 P. 1029,
1032 (1930); Aronowicz v. Nalley's, Inc., 30 Cal. App. 3d 27, 45, 106 Cal. Rptr. 424, 435
(1972).
129. McKee v. Peterson, 214 Cal. App. 2d 515, 527 n.4, 29 Cal. Rptr. 742, 750 (1963).
130. In a one sentence explanation of the term "promissory estoppel," all Williston said
was that "since [the promisee] relies on a promise and not on a misstatement of fact, the
term 'promissory' estoppel or something equivalent should be used to mark the distinction."

I WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 140, at 607-09.
131. This fact was adverted to in Aronowicz v. Nalley's, Inc., 30 Cal. App. 3d 27,44, 106
Cal. Rptr. 424, 435 (1972).
132. 23 Cal. 3d at 7, 587 P.2d at 1139, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
133. 1A CORBIN, supra note 16, § 204, at 232-33.
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promissory estoppel is exclusively within equity. Henderson, however,
advocates that the doctrine be extricated entirely from its sources in
equity and estoppel. 134 He argues that only by such separation will
promissory estoppel gain its deserved identity and that general equitable principles should not modify the requirements of section 90.135
This identity will come about if promissory estoppel is associated with
contract law; only then, Henderson contends, will the proper measure
36
of damages be awarded. 1
In Conclusion: The Case for Promissory Estoppel as a Contract Action
Promissory estoppel has exhibited remarkable resiliency and
growth despite its inability to find a fixed location in the law. As noted,
the origins of the doctrine are traceable to the earliest actions in assumpsit.137 As the consideration doctrine ascended to prominence,
however, the promise enforced solely because of reliance became peripheral in contract law. By the nineteenth century the bargained-for
promise had virtually eclipsed all others; 138 a need for alternative
grounds for enforcement of promises then arose. Unbargained-for
promises were enforced in specific kinds of cases, 139 but no general
principle emerged until 1932.
In that year the Restatement of Contracts "codified" the doctrine
of promissory estoppel. Section 90 immediately gained favor in the
courts and probably is the most widely discussed section of the Restatement. Notwithstanding the Restatement's characterization of promissory estoppel as contract, the doctrine has been given various other
appellations, such as "equitable doctrine" by the C & K court. 40 As
shown by the decision in C & K, the label affixed is of much more than
academic significance; it can have a crucial bearing on the standard of
conduct, the measure of damages, the right to jury trial, and the acceptance of the doctrine generally.
Categorizing an action based on promissory estoppel as anything
other than a contract action at law would cause it to be misconstrued.
The theory of the rights and duties contrasts sharply with tort, as does
the measure of damages. There is a resemblance to quasi-contract because literally they are both situations where in equity and good con134. "If§ 90 is to be unravelled from the estoppel tradition, controlling importance must
be given the specific tests of that section in weighing the factors which bear on relief." Henderson, supra note 13, at 380.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 379 (section 90 does not authorize a conventional balancing of the equities).
Id. See note 109 supra.
See note 13 & accompanying text supra.
See note 15 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 17-25 & accompanying text supra.
23 Cal. 3d at 10, 587 P.2d at 1140, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
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science 141 the defendant should pay the plaintiff. But promissory
estoppel would be submerged by such a connection because the policy
behind promissory estoppel is not as strong; in quasi-contract not only
has the plaintiff been unjustly impoverished but the defendant also has
been unjustly enriched.
As a sui generis action, promissory estoppel would be susceptible
to being called an action which "sounds" in some other doctrine. If
correlated with equitable estoppel or defined as an independent equitable doctrine, promissory estoppel could be exposed to a wide range of
dangers-the standard of conduct could change, there could be less
tendency to award expectation damages, the action could be considered
extraordinary and, as shall be examined in the second part of this Note,
the right to jury trial would be denied.
The evolution of promissory estoppel is characterized by its affinity to both classic and contemporary contract principles. The courts
often discuss promissory estoppel in contract terms, 142 and apply contractual concepts. The decisions discuss promise, 43 consideration, 44
mistake,145 mitigation of damages,146 and third party rights.147 The result as well as the logical process is the same as in breach of contract:
enforcement of the promise and contractual measures of damages.
Judicial receptivity to promissory estoppel in the twentieth century
is consistent with other expansions of civil liability in a society which is
becoming more economically and socially interdependent. 148 As noted
by a California Court of Appeal in justifying a broadened application
of promissory estoppel, the law has not stood still, the morals of the
marketplace have changed, and today stricter standards of good faith
and fair dealing are imposed. 149 Hadley v. Baxendale150 was a pioneer
case in this judicial attempt to reconcile the necessities of the market
with contemporary morality and the decision provided an initial standard for determining where contractual liability ends.' 5' In similar
fashion promissory estoppel is a modem redefinition of where contractual liability begins.
141. See Mains v. City Title Ins. Co., 34 Cal. 2d 580, 586, 212 P.2d 873, 876 (1949);
Weiss v. Marcus, 51 Cal. App. 3d 590, 599, 124 Cal. Rptr. 297, 303 (1975).
142. See notes 26-29, 46-49, 65 & accompanying text supra & notes 143-47 & accompanying text infra.
143. See note 34 & accompanying text supra.
144. See note 60 & accompanying text supra.
145. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 416, 333 P.2d 757, 761 (1958).
146. Id. at 417, 333 P.2d at 761.
147. See note 95 supra.
148. See Fuller, supra note 45, at 823. See generaly Kessler, Contractsof AdhesionSome ThoughtsAbout Freedom of Contract,43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).
149. Aronowicz v. Nalley's, Inc., 30 Cal. App. 3d 27, 44, 106 Cal. Rptr. 424, 435 (1972).
150. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
151. See Fuller & Perdue 1, supra note 13, at 85.
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Those who would deny contract status to promissory estoppel inevitably return to the absence of consideration as the rationale for a
distinction. This argument is vitiated by the understanding that the
doctrine can be understood only in terms of "its history and the society
that produced it." 152 In this light, one can understand why there is no
consideration requirement in Europe, 153 why the English Law Revision
Commission has recommended its abolition, 154 and why it did not exist
at early common law. In the eighteenth century, Lord Mansfield deemphasized consideration in favor of moral obligation as the primordial
source of contract liability. 155 During the era of laissez-faire capitalism
in the nineteenth century, however, the consideration doctrine was
56
supreme. 1
In the twentieth century there has been an uneven retreat from the
bargain theory of contract. Exceptions such as promissory estoppel are
recognized, but these exceptions often are relegated to the outskirts of
the law. Perhaps this reflects the uncertain state of our morality. The
contention here is that promissory estoppel should be brought within
the mainstream of contract law. Both contract law and society would
benefit.
The Right to Trial by Jury
The constitutional right to trial by jury in civil actions in California,157 as interpreted by the supreme court,158 guarantees the right as it
existed at common law in 1850 when the constitution was adopted.
Under this interpretation, trial by jury is a matter of right in civil actions in law but not in equity. 159 This distinction, however, often
presents problems of interpretation regarding both traditional and
newly created actions because California procedure merges law and eq152. Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 599.
153. See Chloros, supra note 65; von Mehren, Civil-Law Analogues to Consideration:An
Exercise in Comparative Anasis, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1009 (1959).
154. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 32, § 4-1, at 133; Chloros, supra note 65, at

144.
155.

156.

See note 25 supra.

See note 15 & accompanying text supra.
CAL. CONST. art. 1,§ 16. The seventh amendment of the United States Constitution, which guarantees the right to trial by jury in civil actions in federal courts, has been
held inapplicable to actions in state courts. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875).
158. People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 286-87, 231 P.2d 832, 835
(1951); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 3d 433, 436, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 912, 914 (1976); Meyer Koulish Co. v. Cannon, 213 Cal. App. 2d 419, 430, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 757, 763 (1963); Veale v. Piercy, 206 Cal. App. 2d 557, 560, 24 Cal. Rptr. 91, 93 (1962).
159. Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. 2d 438, 462, 326 P.2d 484, 498 (1958); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 3d 433, 436, 129 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914
(1976); Paularena v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 906, 911, 42 Cal. Rptr. 366, 369
(1965).
157.
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uity. 160

In People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 16 1 the leading case on the

distinction between law and equity for trial by jury purposes, the
supreme court concluded:
If the action has to deal with ordinary common-law rights cognizable

in courts of law, it is to that extent an action at law. In determining

whether the action was one triable by a jury at common law, the

court is not bound by the form of the action but rather by the nature
of the rights involved and the facts of the particular case-the gist of

the action. A jury trial must be granted where the gist of
162the action is
legal, where the action is in reality cognizable at law.

The court in One Chevrolet added, however, that in determining
whether the gist of the action is legal, "[t]he right to trial by jury cannot
be avoided by merely calling an action a special proceeding or equita164
ble in nature,"' 163 the constitution "is not to be narrowly construed,"'

and the right "is not limited strictly to those cases in which the right
existed before the adoption of the Constitution but is extended to cases
of a like nature as may afterwards arise."' 65 Thus qualified, the test
enables the right to grow with changing circumstances. It directs courts
to penetrate the surface of the law-equity dichotomy and consider the
purpose of each. The test thus furnishes a specific instrument through
which the right can be extended to new actions.
Nevertheless, there are historical and functional problems with the
One Chevrolet test. It fails to acknowledge that the right to jury trial at
common law was constantly evolving and often rested on arbitrary distinctions; it was not a fact which could "be ascertained like any other
social, political, or legal fact."' 166 The test obscures the historical prac167
tice of basing the law-equity division largely on the remedy sought
and often compels courts to undertake a cumbersome theoretical analysis of legal and equitable rights in a way that does not accurately reflect
the historical basis of the distinction. This problem is highlighted in C
& K where the court emphasized an element of the distinction-the
CAL. Cry. PROC. CODE § 307 (West 1954).
161. 37 Cal. 2d 283, 231 P.2d 832 (1951).
162. Id. at 299, 231 P.2d at 843-44 (footnote omitted) (adopting lower court opinion as
modified).
163. Id. at 299, 231 P.2d at 843.
164. Id. at 300, 231 P.2d at 844.
165. Id. at 299-300, 231 P.2d at 843-44.
166. Id. at 287, 231 P.2d at 835.
167. See McCoid, ProceduralReform and the Right to Jury Trial A Study of B'eacon
Theatres,Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1967); Redish, SeventhAmendment Right to
Jury TrialA Study in the IrrationalityofRationalDecision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 486,
490-91 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Redish]. "The jurisdictional line that divided Westminster Hall was drawn largely, if not exclusively, in terms of the remedy sought." C. WRIGHT,

160.

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS

§ 92, at 451 (3d ed. 1976).
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quantum of equitable principles involvedI 68-which was not decisive
in determining the right at common law. An examination of the history of the English system and of developments in California practice
will reveal why the court in C & K exacerbated the problems with the
gist of the action test and why the test should be abandoned. A remedy
test will be proposed, with the sole qualification that in unusually complex cases the court should deem the action equitable. Finally, there
will be a discussion of why trial by jury is preferable for promissory
estoppel actions.
Historical Background of the Right to Jury Trial
The historical fluctuation of the scope of legal and equitable jurisdiction makes difficult any attempt to isolate specific equitable principles, except in very general terms. Equity developed to alleviate the
inadequacies of the common law courts 169 which had rigid procedural
rules and were slow in creating new rights and remedies.170 The popularity of the equity courts, however, stimulated the law courts to expand the common law forms of action' 7 ' and eventually many issues
which once were cognizable only in equity moved over into law or were
treated73 concurrently. 17 2 Each court borrowed liberally from the
other. 1
This evolution was particularly striking in the area of enforcement
of promises. The action of assumpsit developed in the law courts after
equity began to enforce unsealed written promises and oral promises;
previously, the only purely contractual action at law was the action of
covenant which lay exclusively on a sealed writing. 174 Courts of equity
usually had no different standard for determining what constituted a
contract than did courts of law, 175 and eventually the law courts had
jurisdiction over all actions for enforcement of promises, the equity
76
courts intervening only where damages at law were inadequate.
168.
169.

23 Cal. 3d at 6, 587 P.2d at 1138, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
See 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 215 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinaf-

ter cited as
170.
171.

HOLDSWORTH].

Id. at 279-83.
Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial,74 HARV. L. REV. 1176, 1182 (1961) [hereinaf-

ter cited as The Right to a Nonjury Trial].
172. James, Right to a Jury Trialin CivilActions, 72 YALE L.J. 654, 658 (1963) [hereinafter cited as James].
173. Id.
174. 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 169, at 294-97.
175. 1 WILLISTON, supra note 13, § 100, at 372.
176. See Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 592; Langdell, A BriefSurvey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 HARv. L. REV. 355, 362-67 (1888): "It is a tribute to the ingenuity and flexibility of
the common law judges that they succeeded in moving fast enough to stay the Chancellor's
hand so that credit for the development of the general basis for the enforcement of promises
that we know today was theirs and theirs alone."
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Logically, then, if promissory estoppel had existed in 1850 it would
have been triable at law if damages were sought. 177 Moreover, in the
growth of quasi-contractual relief the seemingly contradictory situation

developed where the law courts had jurisdiction over actions where in
equity and good conscience the defendant was required to pay the

plaintiff. 78 At least one chancellor encouraged this incorporation of

equitable principles by the law courts because he was more interested
new standards of conduct than in preserving equity
in bringing about
17 9
jurisdiction.

The jurisdictional division thus was characterized not only by constant evolution, but also by differences which are either irrelevant now
or were arbitrary then. Each court had a different manner of proof and

a plaintiff had to take the rules of one or the other as a package. The
parties' choice of forum thus depended on their procedural preference,

and the use of a jury trial was simply one feature of the legal pack-

age.'8 0 As joinder of legal and equitable claims was impossible in the
law courts, the "clean-up doctrine" developed in equity enabling equity

courts to retain jurisdiction over otherwise legal issues.'81 Competition
between the courts resulted in equity needlessly retaining jurisdiction
over cases which had become actionable at law.' 8 2 All of these factors

suggest that there is insufficient historical foundation for classifying actions as inherently equitable or legal.
The reasons for the existence of a non-jury trial in equity had even

less to do with the parties' needs or with justice than the reasons why an
action was tried in one of the two forums. The early chancellors func177. Modem courts often use deductive reasoning, such as that employed here, to determine whether a new action is analogous to a legal or equitable action under the English
system. See Redish, supra note 167, at 491.
178. The Supreme Court noted this development in Gaines v. Miller, 111 U.S. 395
(1884): "Whenever one person has in his hands money equitably belonging to another, that
The remedy at
other person may recover it by assumpsit for money had and received ....
law is adequate and complete." Id. at 397-98 (citations omitted). See also Philpott v. Superior Court, I Cal. 2d 512, 518-24, 36 P.2d 635, 638-40 (1935); James, supra note 172, at 658.
179. See The Right to a Nonjury Trial,supranote 171. Sir Thomas More, a chancellor in
the fifteenth century, took the initiative and personally invited the law judges to apply equitable principles. See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 687 (5th
ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as PLUCKNETT].
180. James, supra note 172, at 662.
181. This is a procedural device to which the chancellor could resort whenever equity
had jurisdiction of a cause of action for any reason. It entitled the chancellor to decide all
issues in a dispute, legal and equitable, so that there would be an effective termination of the
entire controversy. Clean-up avoided multiplicity of suits and incomplete justice. See 1 J.
POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 181, at 257-58 (5th ed. 1941). See
also James, supra note 172, at 658-59.
182. See James, supra note 172, at 659. See also Eyre v. Everett, 38 Eng. Rep. 379 (Ch.
1826). To some extent, the division was a product of the competition between the King and
Parliament. James, supra note 172, at 663.
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tioned as administrators rather than as judges, and equity was not even
a court initially. 183 The chancellor probably lacked the resources necessary for conducting a jury trial even if he had wanted one. 1 84 It also
seems likely that, as a representative of the king's conscience, the chancellor did not believe that a jury had the right to supersede the will of
the king. Moreover, the chancellor's assessment of the jury's competence to hear a particular case had only limited affect on his decision to
assume jurisdiction, 185 although complexity probably was determinative in the classification of certain actions such as class suits, multiparty suits, and corporate claims. The discretionary nature of a damage remedy similarly did not dictate that the action be tried in equity;' 86 in fact early common law juries had more discretion in some
respects than those of today. 87 This history explains why eminent ju88
rists have stated that there are no inherently legal or equitable issues. 1
It also explains how the One Chevrolet gist of the action test, by focusing on the nature of the rights involved, does not adequately take into
account the difficulty of analyzing modem actions in terms of historical
law-equity distinctions.
Current Status of the Right to Trial by Jury
A look into the current status of trial by jury will reveal that the C
& K method of distinguishing law from equity is even more unreliable
when applied under modem California procedure than when it is applied to history. Equity jurisprudence in California continues its traditional function of providing relief to the plaintiff who cannot obtain
adequate or complete relief at law. 189 The absorption of equitable
principles into legal actions has increased, however, stimulated by the
merger of law and equity which has abolished formal distinction and
183.
184.
185.

See PLUCKNETT, supra note 179, at 163-64.
See generally id. at 209-10.
James, supra note 172, at 661.

186. Redish, supra note 167, at 529. As Redish perceptively observes, the misconception
that because a remedy is discretionary it is equitable may derive "from the general policy
that equity acts at the chancellor's discretion." It does not follow that all discretionary relief
is necessarily equitable. Id.
187. "In 1789, juries occupied the principal place in the administration of justice. They
were frequently in both criminal and civil cases the arbiters not only of fact but of law."
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 399 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
188. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 550 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting). The patchwork
development of the law-equity split illustrates vividly why it has never been possible to erect
a general theory of equity. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 179, at 673-74.
189. See DeWitt v. Hays, 2 Cal. 463, 469 (1852); Paularena v. Superior Court, 231 Cal.
App. 2d 906, 912,42 Cal. Rptr. 366, 369 (1965). "'No principle of equitable jurisprudence is
more firmly established than this.'" Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 512, 517, 36 P.2d
635, 638 (1934) (quoting Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580, 586, 147 P. 259, 261 (1915)).
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established one form of civil action. 190
The forum, form of action, and mode of proof are no longer fac-

tors which can distinguish between an action at law and one in equity.
Even the California Supreme Court has said the distinction "is more or
less arbitrary and groundless."' 9 1 Thus, while merger has simplified

civil procedure, it often has complicated the determination of the right
to trial by jury in situations where the boundary between law and equity is not readily ascertainable.
In such cases where the line between law and equity is unclear
California courts have employed principles which effectively favor the

right to trial by jury. An example of these principles is that a plaintiff
must exhaust all legal remedies before seeking relief in equity.' 92 Another such principle is that "only where the issues to be tried are exclusively equitable in nature"'' 93 will a jury trial be denied.

Other principles that favor the right to trial by jury are more subtle, but also more important. One is that the nature of a cause of action
ordinarily is determined by the type of relief to be afforded.' 94 This
principle seems to be neutral but is not. On the one hand equity formerly had jurisdiction of all cases in which equitable remedies were
sought and in several in which legal damages were requested, such as
accountings and corporate suits. On the other hand the constitutional

right to jury trial was once thought to extend only to those cases that
could be tried to a jury at common law.

95

With the remedy guiding

the courts, as it has in California, there can be a right to trial by jury
whenever damages are sought, even if the action is newly created by
statute. 196 Hence, the effect of classifying actions by the remedy sought
has been to broaden the range of legal jurisdiction. Even without a

direct analogy to a pre-1850 common law action jury trial is potentially
a matter of right.
190. See note 160 & accompanying text supra. "[W]here there is a merger of law and
equity and a single forum is theoretically capable of taking cognizance of all rights, both
legal and equitable, a so-called equitable right may be enforced in a court of law." Offer v.
Superior Court, 194 Cal. 114, 122, 228 P. 11, 14 (1924).
191. Philpott v. Superior Court, I Cal. 2d 512, 515, 36 P.2d 635, 637 (1934).
192. San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irrig. Co. v. County of Stanislaus, 151 Cal. 21,
27, 99 P. 365, 367 (1908).
193. See Ripling v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 2d 399, 408, 247 P.2d 117, 122 (1952).
This principle limits equity more than has been the practice in states where equity jurisdiction exists whenever a case may "properly" be brought in equity. See Note, The Right to
Jury Trial Under MergedProcedures, 65 HARV. L. REv. 453, 453-55 (1952).
194. Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 10 Cal. 3d 665, 672, 517 P.2d 1157, 1160,
111 Cal. Rptr. 693, 696 (1974).
195. Vallejo R.R. v. Reed Orchard Co., 169 Cal. 545, 556, 147 P. 238, 243 (1915).
196. Grossblatt v. Wright, 108 Cal. App. 2d 475, 486, 239 P.2d 19, 26-27 (1951) (jury
trial held to be a matter of right in an action for treble damages under. the United States
Housing and Rent Act of 1947 as a claim grounded in the common-law action of debt).
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Moreover, the classification of an action by the relief requested is
not prevented by the use of equitable principles in that action; as the
does
court in C & K concedes, 197 the application of equitable principles 98
If
not necessarily identify the action or resultant relief as equitable.
this policy were otherwise then the plaintiff who sought damages could
not get a jury if his or her cause involved equitable principles. Significantly, the cases illustrate that the policy of classifying actions by the
relief sought preempts a classification based on the principles employed. 199
Accordingly, in Paularenav. Superior Court2°° it was held that the
gist of the action is determined by the nature of the relief requested
even though this resulted in a court of law applying what are thought to
be equitable principles--contract rescission and an accounting between
the parties. The court remarked that despite the complicated issues and
problems with the judgment to be entered, both of which could have
been avoided if the trial were by the court, jury trial remained a matter
of right and not a matter of discretion. 20 ' Hence, in this case, as in
others, the classification based on the remedy overcame factors that
might have put the case in equity, such as complexity of the issues,
limits of the jury, use of equitable principles, or historical location of
the action.
Courts classify actions by the remedy chiefly because that was the
custom under the English system, 20 2 but another reason for doing so
derives from the judicial practice of redefining equity in terms of the
inadequacies of the legal system as it presently exists. 20 3 The practice,
which has strongly influenced the right to trial by jury, can be discerned in certain pronouncements of the courts, such as: "to give a
proper classification to a cause of action we should seek to find its
counterpart in the history of the English law in the light of such modflcations thereof as have taken place under our own system. ' ' 2°4 Because
197.

23 Cal. 3d at 10, 587 P.2d at 1140, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 327.

198.

Equitable principles are a guide to courts of law as well as equity courts. Raedeke

v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 10 Cal. 3d 665, 674 n.4, 517 P.2d 1157, 1162, 111 Cal. Rptr.

693, 698 (1974); Paularena v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 906, 912, 42 Cal. Rptr. 366,
370 (1965); Ripling v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 2d 399, 402, 247 P.2d 117, 119 (1952).
199. As the supreme court has declared, the distinction between law and equity "lies
more in the relief administered than in the principles applied." McCall v. Superior Court, I
Cal. 2d 527, 537, 36 P.2d 642, 647 (1934).
200. 231 Cal. App. 2d 906, 42 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1965).
201. Id. at 914, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
202. See note 167 & accompanying text supra.
203. For example, the United States Supreme Court has noted that the availability of
traditional equitable remedies must be reconsidered in view of the Declaratory Judgment
Act and the liberal joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1958).
204. Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 512, 516, 36 P.2d 635, 637 (1934) (emphasis
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the formal distinctions have been abolished the only major inadequacy
of the law now is that it does not administer the specific equitable remedies; hence an action seeking relief available at law can be classified as

legal on that ground alone.
Ascertaining the right to trial by jury by the remedy is the most

important manifestation of the redefinition of law and equity in terms
of modem procedure, but there are other examples. One example per-

tains to judicial rulings that issues in a given case must be separately
identified so that trial by jury can attach to those issues which are suitable for a jury. This practice originated at common law, where in a
certain class of cases the chancellor refused to grant relief until after a
preliminary legal issue had been determined at law by a jury. 20 5 It has
been extended in California, facilitated by the unification of the courts.

A request for injunctive relief is typical; it may be required that the
be established at law before the injunction will be
right to an injunction
206
granted in equity.

Actions where the jurisdictions of law and equity have become
concurrent supply another example of the readjustment of the bounda-

ries between law and equity. In matters which were formerly in equity
the courts have found that the context in which the action arises (inva-

riably meaning the form of relief sought) determines the nature of the
action. Concurrent jurisdiction applies to actions such as fraud, 20 7 accountings, 208 equitable estoppel, 20 9 and rescission of contracts. 210 A
paradigmatic instance of where the right to jury trial has broadened
through the recognition of concurrent jurisdiction concerns declaratory
judgment actions. These actions are usually characterized as equitable

because the plaintiff seeks a specific form of relief, rather than damages. Yet the California Supreme Court has ruled that the Declaratory

Relief Act cannot be used to circumvent the right to trial by jury in
cases where such right would be guaranteed if the proceedings were

coercive rather than declaratory in nature. 2 "1 The granting of jury triadded), quotedin Paularena v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 906, 911, 42 Cal. Rptr. 366,
369 (1965). The court in Phipott also said that the distinction between the two forms of
action must be found in their history and development rather than in their intrinsic differences in theory or philosophy. I Cal. 2d at 516, 36 P.2d at 637.
205. James, supra note 172, at 669-72.
206. See Frahm v. Briggs, 12 Cal. App. 3d 441, 445, 90 Cal. Rptr. 725, 727 (1970). See
also LeDeit v. Ehlert, 205 Cal. App. 2d 154, 22 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1962).
207. See Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 512, 36 P.2d 635 (1934).
208. See Ripling v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 2d 399, 247 P.2d 117 (1952).
209. See note 117 supra.
210. See McCall v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 527, 36 P.2d 642 (1934).
211. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.'2d 428, 432, 304 P.2d 13,
15 (1956). See also Grimes v. Elite Ins. Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 130, 146 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1978);
Interinsurance Exch. v. Savior, 51 Cal. App. 3d 691,124 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1975) (declaratory
relief substituted for breach of contract action).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

als in declaratory relief actions is a reminder that the right to a jury
when damages are sought should be only a minimum standard; more
generally, it is a reminder of the impact on the right to jury trial of the
practice of defining equity by the limitations of law.
The continued existence of the equitable clean-up doctrine has
provided a fertile battleground for opponents and proponents of the
civil jury. Accordingly, the present status of the doctrine in California
is a barometer of how far the courts have gone in reinterpreting the
right to trial by jury. The equitable clean-up doctrine was an invalua212
ble device at common law for preventing multiplicity of actions.
Merger of law and equity and liberal joinder rules, however, have eviscerated the sound policy reasons which once were behind it. The doctrine stubbornly persisted in California, but more recently has been
eroded. When presented with equitable and legal claims and defenses
courts for years would characterize the entire case as essentially equitable and decide all issues without a jury, 2 13 although the issues could be
tried separately without the anathema of multiple suits. The more logical view, which is now predominant, is that "[w]here legal and equitable remedies are demanded in the same action, each remedy is
governed by the same law that would apply to it if the other remedy
had not been requested. ' ' 21 4 This view extends the right to jury trial,
pursues the policy of granting jury trial whenever damages are sought,
and redefines equity by modern standards.
This barometer suggests, however, that the right to jury trial in
California has not been extended to the limits that modern procedure
would allow; the extensions brought about by the remedy principle and
the redefinition of equity represent a tendency rather than a firm rule.
For example, when presented with legal and equitable issues the court
has discretion to determine the order of trial, even if the issues involve
common questions of fact.2 1 5 The policy has been for the court to try
the equitable issues first,2 1 6 as a result of which the litigants may be

denied a jury trial on the legal issues because of collateral estoppel or
212.
213.
125 Cal.
214.

See note 181 & accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., Proctor v. Arakelian, 208 Cal. 82, 280 P. 368 (1929); Mesenburg v. Dunn,
222, 57 P. 887 (1899).
Crouser v. Boice, 51 Cal. App. 2d 198, 200, 124 P.2d 358, 360 (1942) (even though

the action is essentially equitable, if the plaintiff requests legal relief, the parties are entitled
to a jury trial on the legal issue). See Pacific W. Oil Co. v. Bern Oil Co., 13 Cal. 2d 60, 6869, 87 P.2d 1045, 1049-50 (1939); Hutchason v. Marks, 54 Cal. App. 2d 113, 119, 128 P.2d
573, 576 (1942).

215. Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 10 Cal. 3d 665, 671, 517 P.2d 1157, 1160,
111 Cal. Rptr. 693, 696 (1974).
216. Connell v. Bowes, 19 Cal. 2d 870, 872, 123 P.2d 456, 457 (1942); Veale v. Piercy,
206 Cal. App. 2d 557, 562-63, 24 Cal. Rptr. 91, 94 (1962); Richard v. Degan & Brody, Inc.,
181 Cal. App. 2d 289, 295, 5 Cal. Rptr. 263, 267 (1960).
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res judicata. This policy is in direct contrast to the rule in federal
courts, where almost all order of trial problems must be resolved in
favor of the right to trial by jury.2 17 There may be legitimate reasons
for the state rule, such as the need for judicial economy and the problem of frivolous legal claims dominating the action, but it still represents a limitation on jury trial.218 Although California courts have not
removed these limitations to date, the trend nonetheless has been toward expanding jury trial rights.
The C & K court aligned itself against the prevailing pro-jury
trend in California. The court did not analogize to cases of concurrent
jurisdiction, although it would be logical to grant a jury trial to a plaintiff who seeks damages under promissory estoppel while denying jury
trial if equitable relief is sought. The court did not even consider dividing the issues of liability and assessment of damages. The court instead
forged an analogy to the case of Southern Pacfe TransportationCo. v.
Superior Court,21 9 an action brought under the good faith improver
statute which permits damages or other relief to persons who, in good
faith, improve property owned by others.220 The plaintiff in Southern
Pacjfc sought only damages, but the court concluded that a claim
brought under the statute was equitable because the language of the
statute invited the court to "'effect such an adjustment of the right,
equities 22and interests' of the parties as is consistent with substantial
justice." 1
The court in Southern Pacjic admitted that classification of an action usually depends on the relief sought and that a jury trial generally
is allowable on the legal issues, but it interpreted the statute to necessarily involve inseparable requests for both legal and equitable relief.222 Accordingly, a jury was not a matter of right, because the jury
might have been required to decide upon equitable relief.223 The claim
in C & K was analogous because the jury in promissory estoppel also
must (at least figuratively) "adjust the equities" between the parties.
The crucial difference, ignored by the C & K court, is that in C & K the
217. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1961); Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959).
218. Another limit on the growth of legal jurisdiction was imposed in Rankin v.
Frebank Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 75, 91-92, 121 Cal. Rptr. 348, 358-59 (1975). The court found
the federal policy of granting jury trial requests in stockholder derivative suits inapposite
because the states are not bound by the federal courts' applications of the seventh amendment. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542 (1970).
219. 58 Cal. App. 3d 433, 129 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1976).
220. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 871.1-.7 (West Supp. 1979).
221. 58 Cal. App. 3d at 437-38, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
222. Id.
223. The court also perceived a legislative disinclination to allow a jury trial under the
statute. Id. at 438, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
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jury was capable of making the "adjustment" because it involved only
the claim for damages. As a result, the C & K court unnecessarily classified the action as equitable, thereby effectively restricting the jury trial
right.
The California Constitution and the Right to Trial by Jury
The state constitutional right to trial by jury224 has been upheld by
California courts through the policies mentioned above 225 and through
specific rules which declare, for example, that wrongful denial of jury
trial constitutes a miscarriage of justice and that the legislature may
not, directly or indirectly, deprive a litigant of the right to a jury trial
through creation of statutory actions or special proceedings. 22 6 In explicating this bias the courts have asserted that the right not only is a
constitutional guarantee but is a fundamental feature of American jurisprudence. 22 7 A strong state policy in favor of jury trial was set forth
in one of the first cases ever decided by the California Supreme Court.
In Payne v. PacpicMail SS.Co.,228 Chief Justice Hastings proclaimed
that "it is the duty of this court to remove every obstacle from a free
exercise of its [trial by jury] right ....-229 Considering this constitutional and historical preference, it is ironic that the C & K court construed legal jurisdiction and the right to trial by jury narrowly while
equity jurisdiction, unsupported by any similar constitutional imperative, was afforded broad scope.
The complex constitutional issue raised in C & K is the extent to
which judicial interpretation can affect the constitutional guarantee.
There is some historical precedent which supports a narrow interpretation of that guarantee. Provision for a civil jury in state courts was not
included in the original Bill of Rights mainly because of the discrepancy in procedures among the original states, 230 but also because a civil
jury was not considered essential to liberty. 23t The United States
Supreme Court has held that the right to civil jury trial is not a fundamental right and privilege of United States citizenship and thus not
protected from state infringement by the fourteenth amendment.2 32 In224. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
225. See People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 300, 231 P.2d 832, 844
(1951); Frahm v. Briggs, 12 Cal. App. 3d 441, 444, 90 Cal. Rptr. 725, 726 (1970).
226. See note 165 & accompanying text supra.
227. See Lofy v. Southern Pac. Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 459, 462, 277 P.2d 423, 425 (1954).
228. 1 Cal. 34 (1850).
229. Id. at 37.
230. See Henderson, The Backgroundof the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REv. 289,
292-94 (1966). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 523-24 (A. Hamilton) (Lodge ed. 1888).
231. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 521-23 (A. Hamilton) (Lodge ed. 1888).
232. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875). In opposition to the majority view, ten
justices have felt that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects from
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deed, it is considered possible for a state to abolish the civil jury altogether without raising federal constitutional problems.23 3 Finally, a
policy reason for the existence of the civil jury in federal actions-to
prevent abuses by a powerful government-is not as compelling in
state court actions.
In addition to this historical precedent, critics of jury trial have
avowed that the jury lacks the competence to perform its task. 234 Further, they contend that even if a civil jury is minimally competent the
advantages gained from a jury trial may not be worth the delay because
the policy beyond civil juries is not as strong as that supporting the
right to a jury trial in criminal cases. 235 Whatever legitimacy some of
these historical and practical arguments have, they cannot overcome
the command of the California Constitution. As noted by Justice Traynor, practical reasons for adopting new procedures are immaterial if
they impair the right to trial by jury.236 As a result there may be no
alternative to interpretations that extend rather than freeze or limit this
right. Since most civil actions have been created since 1850,237 if the
right was not extended it would exist only in a minority of cases, and in
such circumstances it could not accurately be called an inviolate right.
If the California Supreme Court is to take seriously its rule that
the constitutional right to jury trial is the right as it existed in 1850, its
interpretation of the law-equity division cannot ignore that by 1850
there had been great intermingling of law and equity. Chancery was
sending issues to the common law courts to be tried by jury, and the
238
law courts were applying the procedures and doctrines of chancery.
Two nineteenth century acts represent the culmination of this process
of unification which had accelerated during the eighteenth and early
nineteenth century: the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, which
required chancery to hear oral evidence and use a jury while "common
law courts, on the other hand, were empowered to grant injunctions, to
compel discovery, and to admit equitable defenses;" 239 and the Judicastate infringement the privileges afforded by the Bill of Rights. See Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
233. See Karlen, Can a State Abolish the Civil Jury?, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 103.
234. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 108-25 (1949) [hereinafter cited as FRANK]; L.
GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 395-417 (1930); Green, Juries and Justice-The Jury's Role in
PersonalInjury Cases, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 152, 162-64. Criticisms of the civil jury fall into
three basic categories: delay caused by use ofjuries; juror incompetence; and juror prejudice.
Redish, supra note 167, at 502.
235. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 521 (A. Hamilton) (Lodge ed. 1888).
236. Jehl v. Southern Pac. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 821, 829, 427 P.2d 988, 993, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276,
281 (1967).
237. C & K Eng'r Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 23 Cal. 3d 1, 14, 587 P.2d 1136, 1143,
151 Cal. Rptr. 323, 330 (1978) (Newman, J., dissenting).
238. PLUCKNETT, supra note 179, at 211.
239. fd.
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ture Acts which fused the courts of law and equity in 1873.240
If the federal Constitution guarantees the right to trial by jury as it
existed in 1791 while California guarantees the right as of 1850, there is
a valid argument for a broader right under the California Constitution.24 1 When the United States Supreme Court says that improvements in the law affect the scope of equity, 242 California courts can
hardly avoid the logic even if they are not bound by the holding, since
by 1850 the law was so improved that equity had almost lost its autonomy. Interpretation of the right to jury trial can ignore neither the constitutional directive nor the historical pattern; accordingly, the potential
for judicial intrusion of the courts after C & K into that constitutional
right cannot be dismissed lightly.
Jury Trial As a Matter of Right When the Plaintiff Seeks Money Damages
The dissenting opinion by Justice Newman in C & K urges adoption of the basic rule that would assure a right to trial by jury when the
plaintiff seeks money damages. 243 California courts now largely follow
this suggestion as a matter of discretion, but the implications of the
holding in C & K make it desirable to affirm such a standard as a rule.
Because equitable principles continue to be assimilated in legal actions,
the effect of a test that characterizes actions by the principles employed
will be to expand the domain of equity at the expense of law, with a
corresponding decline in the right to jury trial. For example, restitution
long has been considered an action at law although it rests on principles of equity and natural justice. 244 A strict application of C & K
could transfer it to equity because it rests on equitable principles. As
one highly respected commentator has stated, there is no justification
for this expansion of legal relief in equity after merger except a desire
to curtail jury trial, one of the results the architects of merger did not
240.

Id. at 212.

241. There may be further justification for interpreting the jury trial provision of the
California Constitution more liberally than the Supreme Court has done with the United
States Constitution. The jury trial provision has survived several amendments of the California Constitution, see CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (1850); CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (1879); CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 7 (1928); CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (1974), evidence of an intent that a broad
exercise of the right remain. In contrast, there have been no changes to the United States

Constitution which affect the right to jury trial embodied in the seventh amendment. Therefore, policy considerations, such as the advisability of the jury, are more likely to be expressed in the federal area through interpretation of the seventh amendment rather than by
changes to the Constitution. On the state level the fact that the right to jury trial has survived several amendments shows that there is no great barrier to change, so if there is to be a

significant reduction in the use ofjury trial most likely it would be accomplished by constitutional amendment rather than by interpretation.
242.
243.
244.

Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959).
23 Cal. 3d at 14, 587 P.2d at 1143, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
See note 178 & accompanying text supra.
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intend to have their reformed procedure bring about. 245
The C & K test is grounded on the historically questionable postulate that it is possible to isolate specific equitable principles with reasonable certainty, an attempt which Justice Newman terms
"uninstructive fictionalizing 24 6 and which elsewhere has been called a
revival of the "deadwood of the past." 247 The problem with this test is

not solely historical. Due to the lack of any firm criteria the courts will
have considerable discretion to decide what these equitable principles
are, with the inevitable result of an uneven application of the right to

trial by jury. The advisability of jury trial itself is a subject of great
controversy among judges; 248 a test which leaves so much to judicial
construction might subject this constitutional guarantee to subtle ideological attack.
A test based on the relief sought would obviate these dangers and
uncertainties. It would relieve judges of what they consider to be one
of their most perplexing tasks, 24 9 and would relieve litigants of the need
to plead legal theories, one of the evils sought to be eliminated by mod-

em procedure.250 As the law becomes more sophisticated the problem
of applying the frequently ephemeral principles developed before 1850
will only be compounded. A remedy test emphasizes practical rather

than theoretical concerns because it looks to the purpose of the suit and
the remedy which the jury is capable of determining.

These practical goals would be superfluous if they distorted the
historical underpinnings of the constitutional provision, but the very
virtue of the remedy test is that it combines an historical with a contemporary interpretation of the law-equity division. 25 ' As previously
noted, the jurisdictional line at common law was primarily a matter of
James, supra note 172, at 677.
23 Cal. 3d at 14, 587 P.2d at 1143, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
James, supra note 172, at 664.
See Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46, 59 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., dissenting in part);
FRANK, supra note 234; Desmond, Juriesin Civil Cases-Yes or No, 35 N.Y. ST. B.J. 104
(1964) (Chief Judge of New York). See also Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025
(E.D. La. 1972), aj'dsubnom. Hill v. McKeithen, 409 U.S. 943 (1972) (scholarly review of
the civil jury in the United States).
249. See, e.g., Dils v. Delira Corp., 145 Cal. App. 2d 124, 302 P.2d 397 (1956), where the
court concluded that "[d]etermining whether an action is legal or equitable may be a fairsized task under ordinary circumstances, but the problem is multiplied when the relief
sought is a sui generis declaration in which event the court is deprived of the advantage of
considering the prayer as an indication of whether or not the claim is addressed to equity."
Id. at 130, 302 P.2d at 400-01.
250. See Note, The Right to Jury TrialUnderMergedProcedures,65 HARV. L. REv. 453,
456-57 (1952).
251. Blackstone's description of the law-equity division indicates why a remedy test is
also an historical test. Blackstone declared that the two forms are governed by a "parity of
law and reason," explaining: ".1 [the distinction] prinoaloyconsists in the diferent modes of
administeringjusticein each; in the mode of proof, the mode of trial, and the mode of relief."
245.
246.
247.
248.
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the remedy. The early code provisions provided for jury trial in actions
for the recovery of money only, or for real or personal property; such
provisions were meant to be merely declaratory of the existing common
law. 252 This approach is further buttressed by the holding of the
United States Supreme Court in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood 25 3 that "insofar as the complaint requests a money judgment it presents a claim
which is unquestionably legal."2 5 4 The decision, although not binding
on state decisions on the right to jury trial, nonetheless is instructive as
a reflection of historical definitions of law and equity.
A remedy test respects history because it examines history to discover the distinctions between law and equity that were most significant in 1850 and that remain meaningful today. The English system
developed the concept of equity as an instrument for mitigating the
inadequacies of the legal system. 255 Thus it can hardly be considered
an abuse of the constitutional purpose to define equity now in terms of
the present inadequacies of the law-which in effect is what a remedy
test does-rather than as an immutable system having jurisdiction over
certain issues regardless of subsequent changes in law. This redefinition is not easily made in certain contexts, such as determining when
issues should be separately identified. But evaluation of a single claim
for damages substantially simplifies application of the test.
The remedy test will cause an expansion of the right to trial by
jury, but in a manner consistent with the California Constitution. The
test should be elastic enough to account for the changes that were occurring in the period to which the constitution refers.2 56 Presumably,
the framers of the state constitution were aware of the improvements in
the law of England; their strong pro-jury bias, exemplified by the constitutional provision, and their failure to limit the provision to specific
cases demonstrate approval of these marked historical tendencies toward expansion of the right. Improvement and expansion of law is
consistent with one of its normative goals, which is to eliminate the
need for an independent equity doctrine that must compensate for the
law's deficiencies.2 5 7 The extension of the right to jury trial therefore
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *436 (emphasis in original). The different mode of relief is the only one of these differences still remaining.
252. James, supra note 172, at 667.
253. 369 U.S. 469 (1961).
254. Id. at 476.
255. See notes 169-76 & accompanying text supra.
256. James, supra note 172, at 664. The test of what constitutes law also should reflect
the pragmatic approach which has been taken to other concepts in modem civil procedure,
such as in personam jurisdiction. See Kane, Civil Jury Trial: The Casefor Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 33 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kane].
257. See Newman, The Place and Function of Pure Equity in the Structure of Law, 16
HASTINcGS L.J. 401, 422 (1965). "Law and equity are in continual progression, and the for-
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should be effectuated whenever the plaintiff seeks damages. The right

also might be extended in other ways, such as by separately identifying
issues and by resolving order of trial problems in favor of jury trial;
however, equity will remain because modem society has real need for

the specific remedies it provides.
Exception to the Remedy Test
The limited capabilities of the jury occasionally will make it necessary to except cases from the remedy test. The issue ofjury competence

pertains to the ability of the jury to decide issues of fact in complex
cases. A recent line of United States Supreme Court opinions that reinterpreted the right to trial by jury258 has provoked a spirited debate on

this issue. 259 The Court enlivened the controversy in Ross v. Bern-

hard260 when in dictum it stated that the practical abilities and limits of
the jury. is one factor to be considered in determining the legal or equitable nature of an issue. 26 ' Recent federal cases have applied this criterion to grant 262 or deny263 jury trials.
Historically, the competence of the jury occasionally was a factor
that influenced the chancellor's decision to assume jurisdiction of a
case. 264 The limited capability of the jury is one reason why requests
for equitable remedies are tried by the court. More generally, the right

to a jury trial is associated with the concept of a fair trial;265 if a jury is
not competent to decide the issues this historical justification dissolves.

A test based on jury competence therefore is historically grounded and
appealing in light of the complexity of certain contemporary litigation,
but it is fraught with problems of its own.
In evaluating jury competence, the chancellor was dealing with an
mer is constantly gaining ground upon the latter." Spect v. Spect, 88 Cal. 437, 442-43, 26 P.
203, 205 (1891).
258. See, e.g., Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); Fitzgerald v. United States Lines
Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
259. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 92 (3d ed. 1976).
260. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
261. Id. at 538 n.10.
262. See Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950, 953 (4th Cir. 1977), afi d, 434 U.S. 575 (1978);
Minnis v. UAW, 531 F.2d 850, 852-53 (8th Cir. 1975); Farmers-Peoples Bank v. United
States, 477 F.2d 752, 757 (6th Cir. 1973); Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1118 (7th Cir.
1972), a f'dsub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
263. See Hyde Properties v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301, 305-06 (6th Cir. 1974); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 444, 448 (N.D.
Cal. 1978); In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 710, 713-14 (S.D.
Cal. 1977).
264. See James, supra note 172, at 663.
265. See Kane, supra note 256, at 34.
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agrarian society in which illiteracy was widespread,2 66 so it made sense
to exclude the jury from certain classes of cases, such as accountings
and cases turning on the meaning of written instruments.2 67 Exclusion
of the jury from entire classes of cases now is inappropriate because
jury illiteracy is rare. For example, the jury has been relied upon as a
competent fact finder in cases of accounting 268 and in certain corporate
claims.2 69 The usual problem today is not whether the jury is illiterate
but whether it is sophisticated enough to deal with complex cases, a
highly speculative issue. A test based on jury competence therefore
would have to be applied subjectively on a case-by-case, or even an
issue-by-issue, basis. This could grant the judge more power to determine the right to trial by jury than is contemplated by the state constitution, given the rule that the judge may exercise discretion to take a
go
case from the jury only under the rubric of procedural devices2that
70
not to the substance of the right but to its particular incidents.
C & K exhibits the pitfalls that may ensue when a judge makes
substantive evaluations of the jury. In addition to its conclusion that
discretionary remedies are historically equitable, the court also assumed that because the jury would have to exercise discretion it was
not competent to decide the issues.2 7 1 The jury may be competent even
where it uses discretion; it is an oversimplification to regard jury discretion and jury competence as synonymous. In tort law the jury is
granted "wide" and "elastic" discretion; 272 it compares the fault of
plaintiff and defendant 273 and has sole discretion to award punitive
damages
damages. 274 In tort actions at common law the assessment of
2 75
was thought to be within the exclusive province of the jury.
266.
267.

The Right to a Nonjury Trial, supra note 171, at 1181.
See James, supra note 172, at 663.

268.
269.

See note 208 & accompanying text supra.
See Highland Realty Co. v. City of San Rafael, 46 Cal. 2d 669, 683, 298 P.2d 15, 23

(1956); Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969) (jury rendered
advisory verdict on equitable issues); Bank of America v. Lamb Fin. Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d
702, 709, 303 P.2d 86, 90-91 (1956).
270. See Jehl v. Southern Pac. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 821, 828-29, 427 P.2d 988, 993, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 276, 281 (1967).

271.

The court relegates promissory estoppel to equity primarily because the doctrine

"necessarily call[s] into play discretionary powers." 23 Cal. 3d at 7, 587 P.2d at 1139, 151

Cal. Rptr. at 326.
272. Taylor v. Pole, 16 Cal. 2d 668, 673, 107 P.2d 614, 616 (1940); Bernstein v. Cunningham, 176 Cal. App. 2d 283, 287, 1 Cal. Rptr. 234, 236 (1959).
273. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
274. See Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 801, 197 P.2d 713, 719 (1948);
Coats v. Construction & Gen. Laborers Local No. 185, 15 Cal. App. 3d 908, 916, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 639, 643 (1971); Ferraro v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 8 Cal. App. 3d 339, 351, 87 Cal. Rptr.
226, 233 (1970).
275. Jehl v. Southern Pac. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 821, 829, 427 P.2d 988, 993, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276,
281 (1967). See Beardmore v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 793 (K.B. 1764).
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The problem of jury competence is real; it should not, however, be
dealt with by restrictive interpretations of the state constitution that ac-

tually are misleading, covert attacks on the jury. The question should
be debated openly; it is a politically sensitive issue for the judge, and

is unwise without an adequate measureencroachment on the jury trial
276
ment of jury incompetence.
Why Trial by Jury is Preferable for Promissory Estoppel Actions
Although restraints on the civil jury may be advisable due to in-

competence, promissory estoppel actions are not likely to be a cause for
such restraints. The issues generally concern questions of credibility,
which are especially proper for jury determination. The legal theories
are not complex and in fact a promissory estoppel action is probably
more suited for a jury than a contract action because reasonable reliance can be more easily understood than mutuality of obligation.

Fundamental to a promissory estoppel action is the reasonable
person standard; it would be difficult to find a more appropriate issue
for jury determination. From the promisor's perspective, the issue is
whether a reasonable person should have foreseen reliance; from the

promisee's perspective, the issue is whether it was reasonable to rely.
The trial court's use of an advisory jury in C & K underscores the need

for a jury in this action. The issue of damages is within the province of
the jury because they will be awarded either on a reliance or expecta-

tion basis, as in contract actions. Moreover, even when an equitable
remedy is sought the jury can determine liability. As a result of the
to
issues involved the virtues which traditionally have been ascribed
277
the jury would be manifested in promissory estoppel actions.

The strong statutory preference for trial by jury whenever money

is claimed as due upon a contract 278 should prompt the courts to inter276. A few studies of jury effectiveness have been attempted, but the results generally
were inconclusive. See Kane, supra note 256, at 31-33. One solution might be for California
to provide a master to assist in complex cases, as the federal rules provide. FED. R. CIv. P.
53(b). See also Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962). For suggestions on
upgrading jury deliberations see Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation,
92 HARV. L. REv. 898, 915-16 (1979). The problem of delay, however, is best dealt with in
other ways, such as arbitration procedures for small civil disputes. See CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE §§ 1141.10-.32 (West Supp. 1979).
277. The claim has been made that juries bring common sense to the law and mitigate
harsh laws and precedents, in which case promissory estoppel may be particularly appropriate for a common sense jury decision. See 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 169, at 348-50; Redish, supranote 167, at 507. Judge Jerome Frank found many justifications for trial by jury:
(1) jurors are better fact finders than judges; (2) jurors neutralize unjust laws; (3) jurors
protect the public from incompetent judges; (4) jury duty educates the public; and (5) the
jury is a medium for popular participation in government. FRANK, supra note 234, at 12737.
278.

See note 6 supra.
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pret the concept of contract liberally so that rights will not be
abridged. 279 Promissory estoppel should be included within the province of the jury as a matter of fairness and convenience because plaintiffs often will plead promissory estoppel and contract in the
alternative. If promissory estoppel is deemed equitable then the court
could try that claim first and thereby dispose of the contract claim by
collateral estoppel or res judicata; in the alternative the court could label the entire case essentially equitable and try it without a jury.
Conclusion
There is persuasive authority for allowing a jury trial in a promissory estoppel action when damages are sought. The policy of the California courts is to grant a demand for jury trial in all actions where
damages are requested, whether or not the action involves equitable
principles. The compelling circumstances that should be required to
create an exception to this policy, such as historical association with
equity or complexity of the issues, simply do not exist in promissory
estoppel actions. On the contrary, the contract principles drawn from
several eras which have been aggregated to create promissory estoppel
demand that it be treated as a contract for all purposes.
The absence of bargained-for consideration does not undermine
this conclusion. Since the sixteenth century, bargained-for consideration has been sufficient to form a contract, but it has never been absolutely necessary. The law of contract is not inextricably linked to a
particular paradigm of consideration because each era has defined consideration in its own terms. An aspiration of modern contract law
surely is to promote fairness and the reasonable expectations of the
parties; its flexible use of the consideration requirement in pursuit of
this goal emphasizes that there is both a place and a need for promissory estoppel in contract. Courts, commentators, and the Restatement
of Contracts have already acknowledged promissory estoppel's accession to contract status. The California Supreme Court should not subvert this welcome development by denying jury trial in these actions.
The manner in which the court analyzed the right to trial by jury
in C & K is as suspect as the particular result it achieved. It has been
seen that even under the test invoked by the court a jury trial should be
granted in a promissory estoppel action because this action depends
upon basic contract principles to make a promise enforceable. Aside
from the court's assessment of promissory estoppel, it has also been
279.

A nonrestrictive interpretation was suggested by the California Supreme Court

when it said that a cause of action arising from a breach of promise is contractual. L.B.
Laboratories v. Mitchell, 39 Cal. 2d 56, 62, 244 P.2d 385, 388 (1952). See note 33 & accompanying text supra.
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seen that a jury trial test predicated on the principles which support an
action rather than the remedy sought does justice neither to history,
modem procedure, or the state constitution. Equitable principles were
so freely applied at law by 1850 that even then equity could be distinguished by little more than its specific remedies. This process is so
close to completion under merger that the court would have been welladvised to adopt Justice Newman's proposal that whenever damages
are sought a jury trial should be a matter of right. In a single stroke
this test avoids the constitutional problems which, in light of history,
will always arise when a jury trial is denied if damages are requested
and spares the court the problematic task of having to decipher equitable principles. If equity jurisdiction is retained for complex cases it
should be done cautiously, because a jury trial test based on jury competence requires a thorough reassessment of the civil jury.

